

WIELDING THE MILITARY SHIELD AND THE CIVILIAN SWORD:
NORWEGIAN CIVIL-MILITARY INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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ABSTRACT

WIELDING THE MILITARY SHIELD AND THE CIVILIAN SWORD: NORWEGIAN CIVIL-MILITARY INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN, by Major Finn Ola Helleberg, 111 pages.

In 2009 Norway released a strategy for a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, emphasizing the need for improved civil-military cooperation. This paper explores the possible impact of the strategy on interagency unity of effort (UoE).

Factors essential for achieving UoE correlate with the challenges related to UoE experienced by civilian and military professionals in Afghanistan. The strategy neither promotes the factors, nor does it take steps to mitigate challenges. The main reasons are that it does not explain what “a whole of government approach” means, and that it is heavily influenced by the special relationship between the Norwegian government and NGOs. The strategy will therefore not have a positive impact on civil-military interagency cooperation.

In order to mitigate challenges Norway should establish a new generic strategy for handling engagements like the one in Afghanistan. However, there is currently no political will to do so. Involved agencies must therefore take steps to improve UoE within the existing framework. Here lies the value of the 2009 strategy; the process of making it, the debate it inspired, and how it educated people on the importance of UoE, which in turn might have a positive influence on the conditions for achieving it.

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ACRONYMS

ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
DEVAD	Development Advisor
DIME	Elements of National Power; Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic
FSO	Full Spectrum Operations
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MOT	Military Observer Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OGA	Other Government Agency
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC	Regional Command
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America
UoE	Unity of Effort
WoGA	Whole-of-Government-Approach

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Background

In June 2009 the Norwegian Government approved a strategy for Faryab Province in Afghanistan.¹ The stated strategic end-state is to enable the Afghan people to take care of themselves. This end-state is to be achieved by application of a combination of civilian and military means, and through a comprehensive approach. In military terms, the “decisive” operation is the civilian efforts to improve governance, police, and agriculture, while the “shaping” operation is the military efforts to provide a secure environment in which the “decisive” operation can take place. Although different, the civilian and military efforts are linked, and the new strategy emphasizes the critical importance of civil-military cooperation for the strategy to succeed. Some months prior to releasing the new strategy, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre described Norway’s long-term commitment and his view on civil-military interaction in Afghanistan:

The Commander in Chief, Sverre Diesen, uses a somewhat unusual allegory when describing ISAF’s role--that is the military’s role--in Afghanistan as that of the shield and the civilian’s role as that of the sword. [His statement] acknowledges that our civilian efforts are the starting point, and provides the guidelines for our military effort. The shield’s purpose is to provide a suitable working environment for the decisive effort, the effort to win the Afghan people over to peace, which is the role of the sword, the civilian and political effort . . . the building blocks of peace are schools, health institutions, roads, a judicial system and a police force trusted by the people . . . however, to be able to build

¹Norwegian Government, “A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan,” June 2009, <http://www.Regjeringen.no/ud> (accessed 14 September 2009).

these[institutions], a military presence is needed. Until the Afghans are able to take over. . . . Our commitment is a lasting one.²

As already alluded to in the quotation above, civilian and military leaders widely agree on how to proceed and succeed in Afghanistan. The following statement from Major General Lundnes, Commander Office for Operations and Readiness Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also from a speech given prior to the release of the strategy, further underlines this point.

The core of Norway's policy is that progress in Afghanistan is dependent on an integrated civil-military strategy, in which the political process plays the leading role. To reach this goal, it is necessary, to a larger degree than today, to establish a wider and deeper coordination between the Justice, Foreign, and Defense departments. Most importantly, the civilian effort must be strengthened.³

Keeping in mind these statements, given prior to the release of the new strategy, it is of no surprise that a committee with members from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice and the Defense Staff were able to agree on a proposed strategy. Nor is it a surprise that it was approved by the government without much debate.

The new strategy is called "A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan."⁴ Comprehensive in this context means that the Norwegian government has chosen to apply the concept of a so-called

²Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Foreign Minister (Speech to Oslo Military Society, NATO 60th Anniversary Celebration, Oslo, 23 March 2009). Quotation translated from Norwegian by author.

³Major General Morten H Lundnes, Cmdr Office for Operations and Readiness Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Speech at Armed Forces' Afghanistan Seminar, Oslo Military Society, Oslo, 25 February. 2009). Quotation translated from Norwegian by author.

⁴Norwegian Government, "A strategy . . . Afghanistan."

“Whole of Government Approach (WoGA).”⁵ The goal of this approach is to utilize the combined efforts and resources of all involved agencies with the purpose of being more effective. In doctrinal terms this means to strive for “Unity of Effort” (UoE), through “Unified Action”⁶, towards a common goal.⁷ The goal, or end-state, as described in the strategy is to enable the Afghan people to take care of themselves, in a country that is not posing a threat to regional or world stability nor is a safe-haven for terrorists.⁸ Even though the strategy does not go any further in describing a clearly defined end-state, it is relatively clear on the ways and means that lead to it- Norway will build Afghan institutions through international and civil-military cooperation. Briefly summarized, the strategy calls for strengthened coordination between civilian and military actors. At the same time, roles shall be clearly distinguished, and the civilian element is to be drawn out of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and linked to local authorities and the United Nations (UN) as soon as the security situation permits.⁹ As a result of the new strategy, the scope of the Norwegian civilian effort and the number of civilians in theatre will increase. Civilian focus will be on improving police and prison sectors, strengthening

⁵See Glossary for definition.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), IV-1 to IV-4.

⁸Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan,” 1. Note that the goal of preventing Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorism is not mentioned in the strategy, however it has been clearly stated by leading politicians, among them the former Minister of Defense; Anne-Grete Stroem-Eriksen (Speech at Høyskolen i Buskerud, 2 September 2009).

⁹The term “linked” is used in the strategy; however, the strategy does not explain what is meant by the term.

local authorities, development with respect to human rights, and rural development. Military efforts are aimed at providing a secure environment for the civilian elements, while gradually shifting focus toward training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). All efforts shall be integrated with the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies, regional plans, and the Nordic Action Plan for Afghanistan.

Implementation of the strategy has been ongoing for a few months, but at the time this paper is written it is difficult to know whether or not the strategy has taken full effect. It is therefore assumed that it is still in the developing stages. A committee, with members from the ministries involved in Afghanistan, was given the task of operationalizing the strategy, including making plans for implementation, at the time of approval.¹⁰ However, no such plans have been released yet.

The strategy, and its implementation, was criticized from the beginning. Critics of the strategy, from “Think-Tanks” and the media, claim that the strategy relies too much on the assumption that the security situation in the province will soon improve, and that it does not take into account that the opposite may happen. They also claim that it is out of step in dealing with security forces by being inconsistent in the description of the military’s roles.¹¹ This criticism has also emerged in the political realm. Following President Obama’s speech and release of the United States’ strategy for Afghanistan on 1

¹⁰Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Homepage, www.Regjeringen.no (accessed 30 August 2009).

¹¹Halvor Harz, Stina Torjesen and Staale Uliksen, “Visjon eller illusjon i Faryab?” [Vision or illusion in Faryab], *Dagbladet Newspaper*, 26 June 2009, <http://db.no> (accessed 26 June 2009).

November 2009, discussions on the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan in the Norwegian Parliament focused on a possible exit strategy, and indeed, civil-military cooperation. The chair of the Security and Defense Committee, Ine-Marie Eriksen-Soereide, who is from the political party “Høyre” and in opposition to the current Cabinet, stated that:

An increasing number of countries have a completely different approach [than Norway], where civilian and military contributions are operating closer together. If one is to succeed, one must have a closer cooperation. We do not have that [kind of cooperation] since the administration is concerned with a division [between civilian and military agencies] as a principle. I am in this context not speaking about NGOs like the Red Cross.¹²

Both the administration and the opposition strongly agree on the importance of a comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation. This is evident through the Norwegian strategy and reemphasized by the Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg in the same debate.¹³ However, Eriksen-Soereide’s statement bears evidence to the different opinions in Norway about how to synchronize the civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan. It is worth noticing that the opposition argues for a stronger integration between Norwegian agencies even after the release of the June 2009 Norwegian Strategy, and that disagreement is focused around the principles concerning interagency cooperation.

Purpose

This thesis explores the possible result from implementing the strategy, specifically the impact on coordination of Norwegian civilian and military efforts. The

¹²Jostein Matre and Mads A. Andersen, “SV: Vi bør sette dato for uttrekning fra Afghanistan” [SV: We should set a date for pulling out of Afghanistan], *Verdens Gang Newspaper*, 2 December 2009, <http://vg.no> (accessed 3 December 2009). Quotation translated from Norwegian by author.

¹³Matre.

paper is concerned with whether or not the strategy will enable an effective WoGA. The purpose is threefold; First, to provide knowledge on how to achieve civil-military UoE. Second, to provide insight on how the current method of organizing the Norwegian engagement in Faryab influences the possibility for civil-military UoE. Third, to provide insight on which foreign and domestic policies have influenced the formation of the strategy in a way that affects the possibility for UoE. Together these three elements will provide information used to find out whether the Norwegian strategy provides a solid foundation for achieving UoE on the ground in Afghanistan. The paper seeks to answer the research question: Can the 2009 Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive civilian and military effort in Faryab Province lead to improved cooperation and unity of effort? In the end, the intent is to contribute to the relatively small body of sources that cover the concept of a WoGA in the Norwegian context.

Outline

The thesis consists of four main sections. The first (chapter 2) describes the methodology of the thesis. The second section (chapter 3), presents current literature, doctrine and principles on the topic of civil-military cooperation in an interagency setting, with two purposes. First, the purpose is to find universal factors that support UoE and discusses their applicability to Norwegian conditions. The goal is to establish a set of criteria on which the new, Norwegian strategy can be evaluated. The second purpose is to unveil and present factors that have influenced the Norwegian Afghanistan policy by presenting data derived from government reports, speeches, other master theses, and lessons learned reports on specific conditions for Norway. The goal is to provide a

background for analyzing how the strategy has been influenced by these factors and how they in turn have affected the possibility of UoE.

The third section (chapter 4) first compares the factors found in chapter 3 with the Norwegian strategy, in order to identify whether it promotes these factors. Then the chapter presents data derived through interviews with key Norwegian civilian and military personnel on different levels. The purpose is to reveal how Norwegian civil and military personnel on different levels perceive the current status of civil-military cooperation and UoE. The current situation, including problem areas, will then be compared to the Norwegian strategy, in order to answer whether it addresses the necessary factors needed to improve the current situation and achieve UoE. Chapter 4 also analyzes the origins of the new strategy, or more precisely, what influenced the strategy. The data found in literature is used to analyze how politics, principles and special interest groups have influenced the strategy. The purpose is to find out to what extent factors that are unique to Norway and the current political climate have increased or decreased the possibility of achieving UoE between civilian and military agencies.

The fourth and final section (chapter 5) will provide conclusions and recommendations for achieving UoE between Norwegian agencies in general and specifically in Faryab Province, and answer the research question. It will show that the strategy is unlikely, in itself, to be effective in its efforts to achieve UoE and an effective WoGA, because it is too general in its form, and does not promote the factors that lead to UoE. Civil-military cooperation is hampered by the principle of a division between civilian and military efforts established by Norwegian law, standing traditions and domestic politics. Hence, the strategy lacks sufficient flexibility and makes it impossible

to implement operations in which cooperation is a “two way game.” In short, foreign and domestic policy considerations have had a larger say in formulating the strategy, than the rational factors that promote UoE.

That said, the value of the strategy might not lie in the document itself. It is rather the process leading up to the document, and the discussion it has generated that might have an effect on civil-military cooperation and UoE. As the topic is discussed and researched on different levels in all involved agencies, knowledge of the importance of UoE and the need for cooperation will increase and there might very well be a resulting effect on the ground in Afghanistan.

The research methodology used to come to this conclusion is described in the following chapter. Chapter 2 describes why a qualitative research design was chosen, and how it has been adapted to fit the scope of this paper. The chapter goes on to describe the process leading up to the formulation of research questions, provides insight in how the paper seeks to utilize the information gathered through research of literature, and describes how the identified information gap is closed through interviews.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

As discussed in chapter 1, one of the key purposes with the “strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan” is to achieve better coordination, or in other words UoE, between the different players.¹⁴ It is understood that the degree of UoE is one of the factors that will ultimately lead to success or failure in Afghanistan. It is also clear that even though cooperation between all agencies is important, the strategy emphasizes the importance of improving cooperation between civilian agencies and the military. The primary aim of this paper is to look at the civil-military relationship, and investigate whether the strategy meets this purpose, resulting in the primary research question: Can the 2009 Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive civilian and military effort in Faryab Province lead to improved cooperation and unity of effort? This chapter will describe the research methodology of the paper, explain why this approach was chosen, and discuss known limitations and advantages.¹⁵ The chapter is divided into two parts. First it discusses methodology, and second it addresses the process of conducting interviews.

¹⁴Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan.”

¹⁵In addition to the sources referenced in footnotes, the writing of this paper was influenced by a number of other sources; Ann Hogue. *The Essentials of English, A Writers Handbook* (White Plains, NY: Pearson Education, Inc, 2003); Command and General Staff School. *Writing and Speaking Skills for Army Leaders* (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, January 2009); and Kate L. Turabian. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Thesis, and Dissertations*. (Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). The latter is used for formatting the paper.

Methodology

This paper is based on qualitative, rather than quantitative research. The research question provides the basis for the research design. It is formulated to meet the desired intellectual standards by being clear, relevant and exciting.¹⁶ The question is clear and simple in the sense that it can be answered yes or no. At the same time, it is relevant by contributing to the discussion on how Norway should approach the employment of its forces in Faryab Province, Afghanistan. It is also exciting because research may reveal interesting political issues and deep cultural differences between the involved agencies.

The many aspects and variables that influence the success of Norway's Afghanistan strategy lead naturally to the requirement to focus the research in order to make the topic manageable. The research question sets limitations to the scope of the research. The paper will not attempt to be universal, but will focus on the Norwegian efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan, and specifically that of the Norwegian agencies involved in the province. These agencies include the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Agriculture, as well as police and military units. The coordination of Norwegian efforts with Afghan and International Organizations is an essential part of the strategy. However, it will only be covered to the extent necessary for drawing conclusions and making viable recommendations. This means that the paper focuses on a limited area and applies the principles of an intensive form of research. An intensive form

¹⁶D.I. Jacobsen, *Hvordan gjennomfoere undersokelser?* [How to conduct research?], 2nd. ed., (Kristiansand, Norway: Høyskoleforlaget, 2005), 72-73.

of research means that the paper seeks to cover the topic in depth and discover as many aspects as possible while looking at one or more variables.¹⁷

At the same time, it is equally important that the research question does not limit the research too much. As a result, it is designed to be exploratory and thus be the basis of an inquisitive form of research. The purpose is not only to be able to find answers in existing sources, but also to discover new knowledge on the topic.¹⁸ Thus, the question was kept relatively broad by encompassing the entire strategy. To summarize, the limitations and direction set by the research question lead the research towards an intensive and descriptive design, with the purpose of revealing a number of aspects through in depth research of a few variables.¹⁹

Civil-military cooperation covers many aspects. It has therefore been difficult to decide on clearly defined variables that would answer the research question.²⁰ However, it is clear that civil-military cooperation is influenced by both “rational” and “non-rational” factors: “Rational” meaning scientific and deliberate efforts to achieve cooperation and UoE in the pursuit of the goals set for Faryab province; “Non-rational” in the sense that politics, personalities, and interest-groups influence the degree and effectiveness of cooperation due to considerations that might have very little to do with

¹⁷Jacobsen, 86.

¹⁸Ibid., 72-73.

¹⁹Ibid., 85.

²⁰This paper uses the term “Civil-Military Cooperation” meaning interagency cooperation in the context of a WoGA. The use of “Civil-Military Cooperation” instead of “CIMIC” is deliberate. The reason is that “CIMIC” historically has many definitions and might therefore be interpreted in many ways.

achieving the goals set for Faryab province. It was therefore natural to use these two groups of factors as a starting point for developing a method for responding to the research question. The variables for analyzing the Norwegian strategy were decided upon through the identification of three secondary questions that need to be answered in order to respond to the research question. The answers to these questions comprise the factors used to validate the strategy in terms of it leading to UoE, thereby answering the research question.

The first of these secondary questions addresses “rational” factors. It is pragmatic in nature and follows naturally from the research question: Does the strategy promote the factors that are necessary for achieving unity of effort in Faryab Province? In order to answer whether the strategy leads to UoE, it is necessary to identify what factors set the conditions for achieving it. First, the research approaches this question through studies of literature in general. Civil-military cooperation is found in most theaters of operation; however, it looks very different from country to country and province to province. In particular, agencies operate differently depending on the lead country and the local situation. That said, there are probably similarities and universal principles to be found from examining international sources. The first part of this research therefore examines the general principles and doctrine regarding civil-military cooperation with the intent of achieving UoE. The research is directed to answer a tertiary research question: What factors are essential for achieving civil-military UoE, and does the strategy promote these factors? Second, the variable is narrowed to meet the limitations of scope through studies

of literature covering Norwegian conditions and in depth interviews.²¹ The purpose of the latter is to provide a picture of the current situation of civil-military cooperation in Faryab province, and thus provide insight on factors that promote or disrupt UoE between Norwegian agencies. This effort is directed to answer a second tertiary research question: What is the current situation in relation to civil-military UoE on the ground in Faryab province, and does the strategy take steps to improve current conditions? As seen from the tertiary questions, the findings of this research will be compared to the strategy in order to answer the first secondary research question.

The next secondary research question addresses the “non-rational” factors. It is more elusive and difficult to describe: To what extent have principles and compromises in politics and cultural differences influenced the strategy, and how will this influence the probability for UoE? It derives from the fact that civil-military cooperation, interagency operations, unity of action, and UoE are all ultimately a result of human interaction. Human interaction is influenced by beliefs, culture, politics, and others. Strategy is comprised of political ends, ways and means, and so the Norwegian strategy was made in the context of politics. It is natural to assume that it incorporates compromise in order to meet the different interests of the involved agencies, countries, organizations etc. Therefore, the research question cannot be answered by looking at pragmatic solutions for achieving UoE alone. The human aspects must also be addressed. Adding to the importance of this aspect is the fact that Norwegian domestic politics has played a leading role in deciding how at the military side of the PRT should be organized and

²¹Details about the interviews will be covered later in the chapter

operate, which has led to challenges on the ground in Afghanistan.²² The research seeks to answer this secondary research question through studies of speeches and governmental reports, as well as other research on the topic of policy making for the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan. In addition, interviews of key personnel seek to provide evidence as to how cultural differences and political agendas have influenced the probability of achieving UoE up to present day.

In summary, the methodology used in this paper is relatively simple. To answer the research question, the paper approaches two variables using secondary questions. The answers to the secondary questions provide factors that are used to validate whether the Norwegian strategy for Faryab Province can lead to true UoE. The research uses a combination of literature studies and in depth interviews. The alternative to the chosen design would be one covering many variables more superficially - for example a survey. A third option would be a combination of these two approaches. There are both advantages and disadvantages to the chosen design. The intensive and descriptive design was chosen in part to investigate the influence of the human aspect on civil-military cooperation at different levels. In depth research and interviews of a relatively small number of people make it possible to uncover aspects that could be lost in a more superficial survey. Alternatively, it is possible that the findings will not accurately represent the whole truth because of the relatively small number of people contributing. There is always the danger of bias and personal agendas when using such a method. The

²²Major Trond Flatemo, “Norwegian Concept-Development in Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh” (Master’s thesis, Norwegian Defense Staff College, 2008).

research seeks to counter this danger by interviewing personnel from both military and civilian agencies and from different levels of the organizations.

Interviews

As a result of the limited amount of written sources that cover civil-military and interagency cooperation in a Norwegian context, the research had to be based on other sources. The obvious solution to the problem was to interview professionals with practical experience. Since UoE is a result of cooperation and interaction in all levels of war (Strategic, Operational and Tactical), it was natural to conduct oral history interviews in a way that sheds light on the entire process from government down to the forces in Faryab Province. At the same time, valid information would only be obtained if both civilian and military personnel participated. It was therefore decided to conduct interviews with civilian and military counterparts at all levels of the Norwegian effort in Afghanistan.

On the military side personnel from the Ministry of Defense, Norwegian National Headquarters, National-Contingent Command in Afghanistan and the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymaneh were interviewed, and on the civilian side personnel from PRT Meymaneh were interviewed. In order to make sure that the interviews were not simply a snapshot of recent experience, but in fact provided a picture of earlier experience a small number of interviews were conducted with personnel who served in Afghanistan during previous years. The topics covered in the interviews were a result of the information obtained during the study of literature. In short the topics

covered: Cooperation in general, organization, planning, execution and assessment of civil-military cooperation in Faryab province.²³

The interview subjects were first contacted via e-mail, which contained an introduction of the research and a question of whether they would consider participating.²⁴ The e-mail was sent to a larger number of people than was considered necessary for the research, and thus sufficient numbers were generated who were willing to participate, even if some answers were negative. Since the subjects were living in Norway or deployed to Afghanistan, the interviews were conducted using e-mail. The questions were sent out to the individual participant together with a guide for answering. Having received the initial response, follow-up questions were then forwarded in order to clarify statements and have the subjects elaborate on certain answers.

In addition to the interview guide, all subjects were presented with a letter describing the research process and their opportunity to read through any information to be used in this paper in order to ensure accuracy. They were also informed that the research and paper would be graded unclassified, and were requested not to enclose classified information. The last attachment sent to participants was the CGSC approved form "Consent and use agreement for written history materials," which was filled out and returned by all subjects.²⁵ All received responses and data were stored on one single computer, with a back up on a memory stick, in an effort to prevent unwanted distribution of the information.

²³See Appendix B, "Interview Questions."

²⁴See Appendix A, "Request for Interview."

²⁵See Appendix. C, "Consent and Use Agreement for Written History Materials."

Validity and Relevance

The validity of qualitative research results from the degree the researcher's findings address, in a correct way, the purpose of the research and reflects reality.²⁶ Before using the results of the findings in the research, it is therefore imperative to analyze the findings of the research and make sure they meet these standards. According to D. I. Jacobsen's book; *How to Conduct Research*, the results of the research can be tested in two ways: By comparing one's own research with that of others, or by a critical analysis of one's own research.²⁷ Since written sources on civil-military cooperation in a Norwegian context are scarce, this paper focuses on the latter.

The validity of the findings from written sources, described in chapter 3, has been addressed by using the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth to assist in finding sources, by conferring with the Norwegian Command and Staff College, and by requesting interview subjects to recommend informative sources. Through studies of these sources the research has been able to single out a few authoritative works, whose bibliographies then have been used to make sure that this research has taken the most relevant written sources into account.²⁸ The literature described in chapter 3 is considered to address the purpose of this research and reflect reality; hence it is valid.

The validity of the information obtained through interviews has been addressed by deriving the topics covered from the literature described in chapter 3. In addition, the

²⁶A. Johannessen, P. A. Tufte, and L. Kristoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 3rd. ed. (Oslo, Norway: Abstrakt forlag, 2007), 199.

²⁷Jacobsen, 214.

²⁸See Chapter 3; "Authoritative Works."

persons chosen as interview subjects are professionals and have relevant experience. They come from both civilian and military agencies, and there is therefore a relative balance, ensuring information and views from both sides. Attempts were made to conduct interviews with more personnel from the civilian side, more specifically the MFA and the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. However, after some consideration they declined the offer to participate. This over-representation from the military side means that the information obtained through interviews is less balanced than what was intended. Hence, it is a weakness in the data that must be considered when analysing and drawing conclusions, that the reader should be aware of. To counter this lack of balance somewhat, the interview-subjects chosen ensure that all levels of government on the military side involved in Afghanistan are represented. Finally, validity is addressed by interviewing personnel with experiences from different periods of time.

The method of conducting e-mail based interviews is not optimal. It limits interaction between the interviewer and the subjects and may lead to misunderstandings and less elaboration on important topics, since there is no opportunity to explain the meaning and purpose of the questions. However, the risks have been mitigated by encouraging the subjects to clarify using e-mail, telephone, or by correspondence after the initial answers had been received, with the purpose of clarifying and having the subjects elaborate. The subjects have also had the opportunity to review the information used in the paper to ensure correctness. An advantage of this method is that all subjects have been sent exactly the same questions, and that they have had the opportunity to think through their answers over time and respond. This has hopefully contributed to more thorough and comprehensive answers.

Ethical Considerations

The research topic of civil-military cooperation is currently being discussed in the Norwegian parliament and might become a somewhat sensitive issue. Therefore all participants in interviews have been offered the possibility of remaining anonymous. In addition they have been thoroughly advised about the purpose of the research and how the information would be used. All have been presented with, and have signed, a document of consent to participate and to use the information they provided. It is therefore reasonably certain that all participants are fully aware of what they have agreed to participate in, and have taken into account possible future enquiries from such organizations as the press.

Being a professional officer, the researcher is in danger of bias, both when asking questions and when analyzing the findings of the research, by looking at the data through “military” eyes. The risk of this eventuality is mitigated by being aware of the danger, and by making sure to pay attention to the backgrounds of the writers of written sources and interview subjects. That said, the thesis is written in the context of a Master’s in Military Arts and Science degree, and it is thus intentionally written with a military perspective. In total, the information gathered through literature and interviews is considered to be relevant to the purpose of the research and a reflection of reality. Hence, the information is considered valid for use in the analysis and the attempt to answer the research questions in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 will address the meaning of the obtained information in relation to the secondary research questions, and thus form the basis for answering the primary research question in chapter 5. First however, chapter 3 summarizes existing literature relevant to the topic, and answers the first part of two

tertiary research questions: (1) What factors are essential for achieving civil-military UoE? and (2) To what extent have principles and compromises in politics, and cultural differences influenced the strategy?

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe the current state of publications on the paper's topic. The chapter consists of two sections. First, the trends and patterns are identified, including developments in civil-military literature over the last decades, authoritative works, and gaps. The first section is concluded by describing the contribution this paper will make. In the second part, findings relative to the topic are summarized and evaluated in relation to the first part of the tertiary research questions: (1) What factors are essential for achieving civil-military UoE?; and (2) To what extent have principles and compromises in politics, and cultural differences influenced the strategy. That way, this chapter provides background-information for analyzing the impact of the Norwegian strategy on civil-military cooperation and UoE in Faryab Province, which will be done in chapter 4.

Trends and Patterns

This section covers the trends and patterns in literature as it relates to the topic, including developments in sources over the last decades and their relevance, authoritative works and gaps. It concludes by outlining this paper's contribution to the topic.

Development of Civil-Military Cooperation and Relevance of Literature

In the 1970s and 1980s, civilian and military roles and responsibilities were distinctively different. Under the cloud of the Cold War, military operations were usually limited and focused either on limited security aims or they were peacekeeping missions

with a UN mandate used to separate armies or monitor cease-fires.²⁹ Civilian efforts of the same period tended to be concerned with long term economic and social progress planned and executed by host government officials. Civilian “emergency response” was essentially for humanitarian needs, like refugee crises or natural disasters.³⁰

After the end of the Cold War, international intervention changed. Following the UN’s “an agenda for peace” concept of 1992, peacekeepers took up non-military tasks like organizing elections, performing transitional administration and reforming legal systems as a part of complex peace agreements.³¹ Civilian assistance programs shifted focus to promote post-communism reform in Eastern-Europe, and then moved on to apply this expertise to other former dictatorships.³² The 1990s therefore saw a series of complex interventions in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, East-Timor and Somalia. The 1990s also saw a more operational type of diplomacy in support of peace agreements and rebuilding of institutions, and the use of military forces in untraditional ways. The extent of military participation varied with circumstances and the role of military forces was widely debated. By the end of the 1990s, there was still a majority who advocated the traditional division between civilian and military roles and efforts. This perception was about to change following the recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is

²⁹Examples of limited security aims are Grenada and Panama, and examples of peacekeeping missions are Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and Cyprus.

³⁰Robert. M. Perito, *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 191-193.

³¹S.J.H Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2008), 2.

³²Perito, 193.

increasingly a common appreciation for the military to have a role in future situations that may or may not include combat.

The current operational environment, with scarcity of resources, interstate conflict, failing states and globalism as prominent features, has forced the international community into undertaking nation-building in many countries. With this change, it has become increasingly obvious to decision makers that today's conflicts across the full spectrum of operations cannot be won with military power alone. In fact, all "Elements of National Power" should be applied, including a number of government agencies working in coordinated and cooperating efforts towards a common goal.³³ Efficient use of resources depends on the different agencies' ability to synchronize their efforts, which would be best obtained through the principle of "unity of command." However, in the real world the different agencies are subject to different laws and command structures, with respective cabinets or presidents as supreme commanders. Therefore, agencies have to achieve results through the next best thing: Cooperation and coordination to reach "UoE" through "unified action," in order to reach the strategic goals set by the politicians.

Experience from the international community's efforts in nation building in the 21st century concludes that military and civilian efforts must be coordinated to a much larger degree than earlier. The United States has been at the forefront of this development, not surprisingly being the lead nation in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and has

³³The Elements of National Power are Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic means.

taken steps to improve cooperation between government agencies.³⁴ Other nations have followed, as shown by the Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. That said, there are still people both in the military and in civilian organizations that oppose current developments. Some conservative military personnel hold on to the belief that so-called nation-building is not a job for soldiers and should be left to civilian agencies, while the military concentrates on purely military objectives.³⁵ On the other hand, the sentiment among some politicians and personnel in civilian agencies is that there should be a sharp division between civilian and military efforts, in some ways adopting the principles often used by NGOs.³⁶

In the decades leading up to the 21st century, civil-military cooperation and UoE at the local and tactical level was first and foremost a result of individual initiative. As units rotated and missions changed, so did the nature and effectiveness of civil-military cooperation. As the tasks of nation building became more and more prominent in the portfolio of both civilian and military agencies, a lot of trial and error had to take place in order to make cooperation work. The main reason for this was that knowledge and

³⁴For example, “National Security Presidential Directive 44” and the “Defense Department Directive 3000.05.”

³⁵This includes advocates of the so-called “Powell Doctrine,” named after former General and Secretary of State Colin Powell. The doctrine is, among other, based on the principle that the armed forces should enter a conflict with overwhelming force, get the job done, and then leave.

³⁶Made evident in debates in the Norwegian Parliament. Described in; Jostein Matre and Mads A Andersen, “SV: Vi bør sette dato for uttrekning fra Afghanistan” [SV: We should set a date for pulling out of Afghanistan], *Verdens Gang Newspaper*, 2 December 2009, <http://vg.no> (accessed 3 December 2009).

lessons learned were not institutionalized and thus disappeared with the individuals.³⁷ Up until the early 2000s, literature on civil-military cooperation was mostly based on a number of articles and books based on personal experience from different missions. In addition, the sources are for the most part concerned with military forces cooperating with NGOs, or with the military doing development projects with the purpose of force protection and the support of the military mission, which is consistent with the NATO definition of civil-military cooperation.³⁸

The result is that most literature older than ten years does not reflect the current methods of conducting operations, nor current demands on civil-military cooperation and the need for UoE between several government agencies. Since the scope of this paper is civil-military roles and cooperation established during and after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to the present, and the paper is to cover Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan, the sources used to provide information are from the last ten years.

Authoritative Works

Although many books touch on the subject of civil-military cooperation, few cover the topic in detail, especially with regard to the local or tactical levels. Fortunately, people with experience from Iraq and Afghanistan have continued the writing tradition from before the year 2001, and a number of books, Master's theses, and articles have been written on the subject of civil-military cooperation. However, most of the sources only cover parts or fragments of the topic in this paper, and are in many cases

³⁷Rietjens, 200-203.

³⁸NATO, *NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-9)*, 2001. See Glossary for definition.

emphasizing the need for civil-military interagency cooperation and UoE, rather than how to achieve it, or debating what civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is and what it consists of.³⁹ So far, only the U.S. military has provided a more comprehensive and substantial overview of interagency cooperation and UoE in the context of nation building. There are however two books that stand out from the vast number of sources, as they are based on comprehensive research and cover the topic of civil-military cooperation in detail. Hence, authoritative works from the last ten years are U.S. Joint and Army doctrine, *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* by Robert M. Perito and *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency, Just Another Drill?* by S. J. H. Rietjens.⁴⁰ Overall, most sources are coherent with the guidelines provided in U.S Doctrine and the literature review of Rietjens' research, albeit not as comprehensive. When summarizing the findings on how to achieve UoE in current literature the paper will therefore derive most of the factors from these authoritative works.

Gaps

Current literature provides good sources of information on the topic of civil-military cooperation in general. It would seem like the United States of America (U.S.)

³⁹Some examples are: Andrew J. C. de Ruiter, "Civil Military Cooperation: Core Business in (future) Peace Support Operations?" (Master's thesis, Army War College, 1999); Lene Kristoffersen, "Sivilt-militaert samarbeid (CIMIC)" [Civil-military cooperation], *Kortinfo fra DNAK 2*, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, 2006; and Michael F. Minaudo, "The Civil-Military Relations Cube: A Synthesis Framework for Integrating Foundational Theory: Research, and Practice in Civil-Military Relations" (Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2009).

⁴⁰The most important volumes of U.S. doctrine relating to unity of effort are listed in the bibliography; Perito; Rietjens.

and Holland are at the forefront of publishing comprehensive works of lessons learned over the last ten years.⁴¹ Contributions from other countries exist, but are sporadic and fragmentary.⁴² However, studies of current literature provide solid information for providing an understanding for which factors are essential to achieving UoE between agencies, and help answer the tertiary research question: What factors are essential to achieving interagency unity of effort? The scope of this paper is to cover civil-military cooperation and UoE between Norwegian agencies in Faryab province in Afghanistan. Literature covering this scope in detail is very hard to find. There are some sources such as speeches, reports, government web-sites and a few Master's theses, but the vast majority of these sources are not at all comprehensive.⁴³ That said, there is one exception: in March 2010 the "Norwegian Institute of International Affairs" published a comprehensive study on Norwegian foreign policy and its impact on the approach in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ The contents of this report will be referred to later in the chapter when

⁴¹Most publications comparing Norway's approach in Afghanistan to that of other nations use The Netherlands' approach as a reference.

⁴²One example is, Kristin M. Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho, "Civil-military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations" *Security Practice* 2, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2007, which is published as a preliminary document from ongoing research on the topic.

⁴³Norwegian Defense Staff, Defense Forces, *Doctrine for Land Operations* (Oslo, Norway: Government Printing Office, 2004), and Norwegian Defense Staff, *Defense Forces Joint Doctrine* (Oslo, Norway: Government Printing Office, 2007). Norwegian doctrine does not cover the topic in any detail, and moreover, it refers to the term CIMIC as it has traditionally been used in peacekeeping missions, hence the Norwegian Staff College uses US doctrine, like FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, as a reference.

⁴⁴Cedric de Coning, Helge Luraas, Niels Nagelhus Schia, and Staale Ulriksen, "Norway's Whole of Government Approach and its Engagement in Afghanistan," *Security in Practice* 8, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010.

describing the influence of politics on the strategy. Despite this report, the largest gap in literature as related to the topic and scope of the paper is found in sources related to specific Norwegian conditions over the last ten years.⁴⁵

The Contribution of this Paper to the Topic

This paper will attempt to fill some of the gaps mentioned above by gathering and systemizing existing information in written sources, and through conducting interviews with key personnel with experience in civil-military cooperation in Faryab province. The purpose is to provide knowledge on civil-military cooperation in a Norwegian context, and how to achieve UoE between Norwegian military and civilian agencies.

Summary and Evaluation of Findings in Literature

This section reviews findings in literature, primarily authoritative works, in order to examine the general principles and doctrine, derived from experience, covering civil-military cooperation with the intent of achieving UoE. The purpose is to uncover universal “must have” factors for achieving UoE. Next, international and domestic political factors with an impact on the strategy will be presented. The section concludes by examining the validity of the essential factors for Norwegian conditions.

In chapter 4 the factors uncovered will be compared to the Norwegian strategy in order to answer the first secondary research question: Does the strategy promote the

⁴⁵This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Norwegian Defense Forces has put Major General Jon Berge Lilland in charge of a research project on civil-military cooperation, and that the “Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies” in cooperation with the “Norwegian Institute of International Affairs” is conducting research on how best to approach the situation in Afghanistan, <http://mil.no/felles/ifs/start/article/jhtml?articleID=168361>.

factors that are necessary for achieving unity of effort in Faryab Province? and analyzed in order to answer the second secondary research question: To what extent have principles and compromises in politics, and cultural differences, influenced the strategy, and how will this influence the probability for unity of effort?

Factors Essential to Unity of Effort

When addressing the question of what factors are a “must have” to achieve UoE, it is natural to start with a broad look at which factors influence civil-military cooperation. In his book, S. J. S. Rietjens identified these factors through extensive research, and grouped them in clusters.⁴⁶ Although he did not distinguish between Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), his findings are still illustrative. The main difference between military cooperation with NGOs and OGAs is that NGOs have a choice as to whether or not to coordinate their efforts. Government agencies are given orders by the political leadership. As mentioned in chapter 1, this paper focuses mainly on interagency-cooperation; however, it will include NGOs where it is natural. Table 1 illustrates his findings.⁴⁷ Rietjens’ research does not single out any factors to be more important than others; rather, his findings are that all factors play a part and will influence the cooperation. Although there is a difference in the words used, the factors identified by Rietjens’ correlate with the majority of other sources, in particular most of the factors are covered by U.S. doctrine, and important factors like culture, tasks, and other differences between agencies are

⁴⁶Rietjens, 35.

⁴⁷Ibid., 35.

emphasized throughout Perito's book.⁴⁸ This correlation, however, is hardly surprising, since what he is really pointing at is that differences in objectives, timelines, organization, culture, resources, and the operational environment influence cooperation.

Table 1. Identified Factors Influencing Civil-Military Cooperation

Factors	Clusters					
	Policy and Domain	Time frames	Structures and Cultures	Coordination and Communication	Means	Contingency factors
	- Tasks	- Time horizon	- Organization structure	- Coordination	- Resources	- Proliferation of civilian actors
	- Humanitarian principles	- Continuity	- Organization culture	- Communication	-Technology	-Operational environment
	- Mandate	- Transfer	- Local culture			- Unity of effort
	- Use of Force		- Trust			

Source: S. J. S Rietjens. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency, Just another Drill?* (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2008), 35.

More interesting and surprising is that Rietjens' extensive research concluded that little has been written about the process of civil-military cooperation itself and that literature on the subject has paid very little attention to the evaluation of civil-military cooperation, including criteria to be used.⁴⁹ His research therefore concentrated on finding an appropriate model for initiating, executing and evaluating civil-military operations, and ways of evaluating performance. When suggesting a model for cooperation, his focus was first and foremost on military cooperation with NGOs and other non state partners. Hence, his conclusions do not directly apply to this papers focus

⁴⁸Perito.

⁴⁹Rietjens, 34.

on interagency cooperation with the purpose of achieving UoE. However, there are some important “take-aways.”

Consistent with U.S. doctrine is Rietjens’ emphasis on a systematic approach to cooperation, in which all participants are involved in setting guidelines, planning, execution and evaluation.⁵⁰ It is also worth noticing his findings about assessment and evaluation. His research shows that the outcome of prior cooperation has been difficult to assess. The reason for this is that results often have been measured by the different organizations involved, and against the different organizations’ goals. Therefore, the results of the cooperation itself have not been evaluated. Rietjens makes the point that if results were measured against the effect on the local people and environment, they would provide a more accurate picture of the joint efforts. Rietjens’ book provides a good overall starting point for looking at factors that affect civil-military cooperation. However, in order to narrow down his identified factors to those that influence interagency UoE, one must look elsewhere.

In general, civilian sources differ from those written by military personnel. While the civilian approach to the subject is often principal and general, the military tends to want to rationalize and provide detailed information, almost in the form of checklists. Hence, literature pays evidence to differences in culture and ways of looking at cooperation between civilian and military agencies. The result of this difference in approach is that it has been very hard to find factors that civilian theorists find to be essential for achieving UoE. Generally civilian sources point to understanding differences in culture, interpersonal relationships, and a common overall goal as key for good

⁵⁰Rietjens, 57.

cooperation.⁵¹ When looking for more detailed “must have” factors that promote effective civil-military cooperation, albeit from a military perspective, it is therefore natural to turn to U.S. doctrine. This is the only source that comprehensively describes how to achieve effective and efficient civil-military cooperation. More specifically Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Non-governmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations* Vol 1 and 2, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* are good sources. For all practical purposes, the U.S. doctrine describes a methodology for approaching the factors Rietjens found to affect civil-military cooperation, and it incorporates the factors that civilian sources point to as being most important.⁵²

By applying the doctrinal concept of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) as the military element of a WoGA to conflict resolution, the U.S. Armed Forces have recognized that Stability Operations and the inherent need for civil-military cooperation and UoE is essential for achieving success in any military operation.⁵³ FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* describes the challenges of interagency cooperation and the Army conceptual approach to overcome them:

⁵¹Perito, in fact, most of his book is dedicated to inform the reader about different agencies, organizations and the military; Ryan Crocker (Speech Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December, 2009); Sigurd Marstein, Former Civilian Coordinator PRT Meymaneh, Electronic interview by author, November 2009.

⁵²See table 1 for Rietjens’ findings.

⁵³FSO as described in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-1; WoGA as described in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-2 to 1-4.

The integrated approach necessary to achieve true unity of effort in a comprehensive approach to stability operations is attained through close, continuous coordination and cooperation among the actors involved. This is necessary to overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.⁵⁴

U.S. doctrine describes a number of success factors in order to provide planners and commanders with guidelines for conducting effective civil-military cooperation, and unified action, which leads to UoE. The foundation for success is to “organize for success.”⁵⁵ As part of this organizing, doctrine emphasizes the importance of preparing all agencies prior to conflict and deployment, which means that all involved agencies should have a common understanding of the overriding concept of a WoGA and the interdependency of the involved agencies. This understanding should include a common terminology and pre-determined procedures for determining which is the lead agency and the roles of the different departments.⁵⁶ In addition, overall command structure and coordinating committees at the strategic level should be permanent and provide continuity and predictability. At the operational level, concepts for civil-military cooperation should be in place, such as; the “Essential Stability Task Matrix” and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).⁵⁷ In order for these steps to be taken and for

⁵⁴FM 3-07, 2-4.

⁵⁵Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 7.

⁵⁶Kristin M Haugevik, and Benjamin de Carvalho, “[718] Working Paper: Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations,” *Security in Practice* 2, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2007, 10-15.

⁵⁷FM 3-07, 2-4; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), II-10.

the committees and command structure to work, laws and regulations enabling cooperation, information sharing and so on, must be in place.

Having the overall organization and regulations for cooperation in place and functioning, there are certain factors critical for the success of the mission. First, it is important to integrate all participating agencies early in the process. A common understanding of the operational environment and the problem at hand is the basis for cooperation. Equally important is that all understand the conditions of the desired end-state. Every agency should take part in planning, development of courses of action and consider multiple options. In this way all aspects of the mission are considered and there is a bigger chance of mutual support and UoE. U.S doctrine emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach and the need for “reverse planning” meaning that one must start planning by determining the conditions that make up the desired strategic end-state for the area of operations. Hence, plans for transition to a purely civilian phase should be made from the beginning, ensuring that every effort leads towards this end and the strategic end-state.

As stated in the quotation from FM 3-07 above, there are a number of differences between agencies, including culture, organization, language, goals and restrictions.⁵⁸ In order to facilitate cooperation it is important to find and understand these differences.⁵⁹ Such an understanding for each other’s situation will help limit misunderstandings and

⁵⁸FM 3-07, 2-4, 33.

⁵⁹The importance of understanding the different agencies’ cultures and capabilities is also strongly emphasized in Robert. M. Perito’s book *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*. In fact most of the book is devoted to clarify the difference, capabilities and significance of different agencies and organizations. The importance is also emphasized by Haugevik.

lower frustration. Knowing and understanding the different organizations is the starting point for coordinating efforts and establishing the way to work. In this respect, the participating organizations should establish common references as a starting point for communication, find ways to utilize prior experience, and agree on roles and responsibilities. Common understanding of assessment criteria and methodology is also of great importance.

Even if unity of command is seldom possible in interagency operations, actions should be taken to achieve a command structure that is as close as possible to it. One possibility is to use the concept of “Hand Shake Con,” which is based on informal agreement. The overriding principle is to make every effort to achieve true UoE through unified action.

Personal Experience of Leading Figures

Throughout the academic-year, CGSC organizes for guest speakers to address the students and faculty in order to let both civilian and military leaders contribute to professional development. Speakers have included generals, ambassadors, business leaders and more. Several have spoken to the importance of UoE, both between military services and especially between government agencies. Many use the cooperation developed between the Commanding General of the Coalition Forces David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Iraq as an example as to how the civilian and military representatives should work to achieve UoE. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker themselves held the cooperation between them to be a critical factor for making the surge in Iraq possible, and for its success. Cooperation and subsequent UoE was made possible by two factors: personal relationships and trust, as well as the co-location of their

offices.⁶⁰ Given the statements of a number of guest speakers and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker themselves it is natural to include the factors of personal relationships and co-location to the list of factors most important for promoting UoE, albeit through the application of so-called “hand-shake con.”⁶¹

To conclude this section, with the purpose of achieving clarity, the factors found in current literature that are considered essential to achieve UoE are listed in table 2.

Table 2. Factors Essential to Achieve Unity of Effort.

1. **All agencies must have a common understanding of the *Whole of Government Approach*, including terminology, procedures, way of organizing cooperation, laws, and regulations. Critical factors are:**
 1. Integrate all agencies as early as possible
 2. Common understanding of the problem, the operational environment and end-state.
 3. All agencies take part in planning and Course of Action development (bigger chance of mutual support)
2. **Understand differences in culture, respect the differences, and work from there to develop:**
 1. Common references
 2. Utilize prior experience
 3. Define roles and responsibilities
 4. Assessment criteria and methodology
3. **Have a holistic approach (Reverse planning from transition to a purely civilian phase).**
4. **Organizations and individuals make every effort to achieve unity of effort , especially if unity of command is not possible.**
5. **Personal commitment, personal relationships, mutual trust, and co-location of leadership greatly enhance the possibility of achieving unity of effort.**

Note: a) Agencies put different emphasis on the individual factors; military are generally more detail focused and want a system and a “checklist”, while civilians have a more general approach.

b) Theorists agree that the factors apply to all levels; strategic, operational and tactical.

Source: Created by author.

⁶⁰Ryan Crocker (Speech, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December, 2009); General David Petraeus (Speech, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 November, 2009).

⁶¹The importance of personal relationships and commitment to UoE is also emphasized by several of the people interviewed about Norwegian conditions, one example is; Colonel Ole-Asbjørn Fauske, former National Contingent Commander in Afghanistan, Electronic interview by author, January 2010.

International and Domestic Policies Affecting Norway's Afghanistan Approach

In this section, studies of speeches, master's theses and research institute reports, as well as other research on the topic of policy making for the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan will be examined in order to try to paint a picture of the process leading up to the Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive approach in Faryab. This data will be analyzed to answer of the next secondary question: To what extent have principles and compromises in politics, and cultural differences influenced the strategy, and how will this influence the probability for unity of effort?

Having established that Norway's approach to a WoGA approach is somewhat different from many other countries in the way it emphasizes the sharp division between civilian and military undertakings, and that this division in some ways stands in the way of UoE, it is natural to look deeper into what motives the Norwegian government has for taking this approach. In other words, how do we find out what has shaped Norway's Afghanistan policy. Afghanistan is not the only foreign engagement of the Norwegian government, therefore it is natural to start with a broader context, and then look into how this has affected the efforts in Afghanistan. The primary source used to describe the foundations of Norwegian foreign policy is the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs report from March 2010, which provides updated, detailed information on Norway's foreign policy and its application in Afghanistan.⁶²

⁶²Cedric de Coning, Helge Luraas, Niels Nagelhus Schia, and Staale Ulriksen, "Norway's Whole of Government Approach and its Engagement in Afghanistan," *Security in Practice* 8, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010.

Norwegian foreign policy has been described as a product of “pragmatic idealism,” which is based on the desire to “maximize international influence.”⁶³ Since the Second World War, Norway’s approach to foreign policy matters has been based on decision makers’ understanding the fact that Norway would have little influence in the world on her own. Therefore, she has taken the position that international issues should be resolved through multinational institutions based on the national state as the “principal, sovereign and equal unit.”⁶⁴ Hence, Norway is a strong supporter of the UN, and all kinds of international bodies and agreements, not the least as a member of NATO. From this approach, it follows that acting unilaterally is only done in very deliberate settings, the prime example being Norway’s attempts in negotiating peace around the world, with the Middle East, Sri-Lanka, and Sudan being a few examples. Although the primary target has been to reach a peace agreement, these negotiations have been conducted with an aim of maximizing international influence, and have therefore often been set in a multinational framework, something of which the so-called “Oslo Treaty” between Israel and the Palestinians, is a primary example; the treaty being signed on the White House Lawn.⁶⁵ The perception of Norway as a “Nation of Peace,” is rooted in large segments of Norway’s population because of this approach to foreign affairs, a sentiment made even stronger by events like the annual Nobel Peace Prize.⁶⁶ Hence, Norway’s approach to foreign policy works well internationally as it supports the aim of

⁶³Thune and Ulriksen, *Security in Practice* 2, 2007.

⁶⁴de Coning, 21.

⁶⁵Ibid., 22.

⁶⁶Ibid.

maximizing international influence, and it is popular with the voters because they feel it is the right thing to do.

Equally deeply rooted in the perception of Norwegians, is the role of the military. Traditionally, the military's role has been the defense of one's own territory against aggressors. Based on conscription and compulsory service, the defense of the homeland is to be achieved using "citizens in uniform," and this is still how much of Norway's defense is organized. The only exception from this role was the contribution of troops to UN peace operations. In fact, Norway was one of the major troop contributors to the UN up until the late 1990s.⁶⁷ In the mid nineties however, there was a major shift in the deployment of military units from defense of the homeland and UN missions, to NATO led international operations. With this shift followed a change from peace operations to more combat like operations, and the military changed from a "citizen in uniform" type of force to a more professional one. The shift of focus culminated with Norway's participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However after changing governments following the 2005 election, there has been a movement to engage more in UN led operations such as the current field hospital deployed to the country of Tchad in Africa.

While the Norwegian approach to the global society of national states and military posture is hardly surprising for a small nation, and may be considered intuitive, there is another aspect of foreign policy that is different to that of other nations. Although the other Nordic countries have similar ways of organizing their relationship with non-governmental organizations, Norway has taken it a step further.

⁶⁷de Coning, 21.

Due to a very sizable foreign aid budget over time, and the scope and influence that follow the economic commitment, Norway has developed a relatively unique, informal and flexible model of cooperation between state and non-state actors, especially when it comes to development and humanitarian efforts.⁶⁸ In these areas, the MFA, private research institutes, and NGOs cooperate in an “intentional,” “normative,” and “symbiotic” relationship as extensions of Norwegian influence.⁶⁹ Part of this picture is the development of personal relationships between leading figures within the NGO and research community, and political parties. For example Norway’s Foreign Minister was formerly the Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross, and the Party Secretary of the Labor Party (the largest party in government) is a former official in the Norwegians Peoples Aid NGO.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Concept

The purpose of this description of PRTs in general and the Norwegian PRT Meymaneh in particular is to provide the reader a point of reference when reviewing the information gathered through interviews about the situation in Faryab province. Although this paper is not about PRTs as such, all government agencies involved in Faryab province are currently a part of the PRT and will, according to the Norwegian strategy, continue to be so until the security situation has improved. Hence, Norway’s WoGA will be conducted within the framework of the PRT for some time to come. That said, this paper covers interagency cooperation and UoE in a general sense and seeks to approach

⁶⁸de Coning, 24, a fact also emphasized by Brigadier General B.T Solberg from DoD when interviewed.

⁶⁹de Coning, 23.

the topic in a way that is also viable outside the PRT context. The *PRT Handbook* is used as the main source for describing PRTs in Afghanistan in general.⁷⁰

PRTs in Afghanistan in General

The PRT mission statement says: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”⁷¹ The purpose of a PRT is to overcome the challenges of building the capacity of GIROA in an unstable and insecure environment. It is to focus on strengthening the three pillars of security, governance and economic development. As the security situation improves, it is to shift focus to enabling greater reconstruction and development. Once the province is safe, and the military element is no longer needed, the PRT will be dismantled leaving development efforts to traditional and more effective civilian development components.⁷²

The following quote from the *PRT handbook* describes the purpose of the PRTs:

A PRT is a civil military institution that is able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and development components. . . . Some PRTs require the capabilities of the military component more because they are in much more unstable areas, while other PRTs may begin to draw down their military component once the civilian agencies become more capable of accomplishing their tasks without military assistance. . . . The PRT itself is neither a combat nor a development institution. A

⁷⁰Commander ISAF, *PRT Handbook*, 2009, <https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/PRT%20Handbook%20Edition%204.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2010), 3.

⁷¹*PRT Handbook*, 3.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 8.

PRT may perform and support such activities in the pursuit of stability, but these activities are not the primary purpose of the PRT. The PRT is an important component of the counterinsurgency campaign. As such, a PRT's measure of success is not how many development projects it completes, but how all of its activities fully support the end-state goal of improved stability and capable Afghan governance. A critical role for the PRTs enroute to stability is to continuously shape the security and governance environment through active engagement with all levels of provincial society, as well as civil service and security force capacity building. This in turn will allow Afghan and other governments' development agencies, IOs and NGOs to conduct R[econstruction] and D[development], in a virtuous circle that extends stability.⁷³

The Norwegian PRT Meymaneh


PRT Meymaneh is situated in Faryab province in Northern Afghanistan with Norway as the lead nation. In addition there are personnel from Latvia, Iceland and Macedonia (FYROM). Ever since Norway took over lead of the PRT from the British, it has been subject to constant expansion and changes in organization and tasks. That said, the core of its activities has always been centered on the mission and purpose found in the ISAF PRT handbook. The organization has therefore always had leadership and staff, a civilian element, military observer teams (MOT), combat service support (CSS), and force protection (FP) as core elements. The most radical changes started in 2007 and have continued to present day. In 2007 Norway terminated its battalion size Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for RC North and concentrated all efforts in Faryab province. That way a maneuver force, a so-called Task Unit (TU), was added to the PRT. The PRT could thus engage in counterinsurgency operations directly, and has also done so as the security situation has deteriorated. Later a helicopter wing, Norwegian Aerial Detachment (NAD), was added and also a Latvian force protection company (FPcoy), increasing the number of personnel to 425. The year 2009 also saw a strengthening of the civilian element by

⁷³*PRT Handbook*, 8-9.

the appointment of a civilian coordinator (COS). Hence, by the end of 2009 the composition of the PRT had grown to its largest number of personnel and largest capacity ever. Another significant event was the annexation of a part of the RC West area of operations, in order to more effectively approach the situation in the Gwohrmach area.⁷⁴ Table 3 depicts the organization as of December 2009. Civilian elements are the Development Advisor (DEVAD), Political Advisor (POLAD) and Police, as well as the Civilian Coordinator (COS).

Table 3. Organization Chart, PRT Meymaneh, Faryab Province

Organisasjon PRT Mey 2/09



Source: Major Steinar Dahl, NOR PRT MEY 2009/2, Chief J-3/5/7, June-December 2009.

⁷⁴Gwohrmach is a specially challenging area with a low level of security; the area is given special attention in the Norwegian strategy.

The Factors' Validity for Norwegian Conditions

As mentioned in chapter 1, belief in the traditional division between civilian and military tasks, both from military personnel that think military units should stick to war fighting and civilians that believe they should stay away from military units and tasks, is still persistent in some communities in Norway.

Even if the Norwegian concept for operating in Faryab province might make formal integration of civilian and military efforts and agencies more difficult, there is no reason why the factors derived from U.S. doctrine and the authoritative works discussed previously should not apply also to Norwegian conditions. Norwegian political culture, traditions and laws might indeed hamper the ability to achieve UoE. However, that fact does not affect the validity of the factors that promote UoE. Rather, it points to areas and approaches that might have to be changed in order to achieve UoE, and in turn achieve the purpose and end-state of the Norwegian Strategy. This possibility will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5. In addition, chapter 4 explores the findings made through interviews, including the current situation in Afghanistan in terms of UoE, and whether uncovered problem areas are addressed by the strategy. Finally, chapter 4 looks at how Norwegian domestic politics and overall foreign policy might have influenced the possibility of achieving UoE in Faryab province.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the secondary and tertiary research questions by analyzing the findings from literature and interviews. The answer to these questions will then be used to answer the research question in chapter 5. The chapter consists of two sections, one for each of the two secondary research questions.

Does the Strategy Promote the Factors that are Necessary for Achieving Unity of Effort in Faryab Province?

This section starts by answering whether the Norwegian strategy promotes the factors essential to UoE.⁷⁵ The factors found in the literature and the Norwegian strategy for Faryab province are compared and analyzed to answer the question. Then it covers unique conditions for Norwegian agencies in Afghanistan: What is the current situation in relation to civil-military UoE on the ground in Faryab province, and does the strategy take steps to improve current conditions? The status of cooperation and civil-military operations is described using data from interviews of key-personnel and then compared to the Norwegian strategy for Faryab province. The purpose is to establish whether it addresses the issues that hamper UoE, and promote factors that promote UoE. The section concludes by using the information found when responding to the two tertiary questions to answer the first secondary question: Does the strategy promote the factors that are necessary for achieving unity of effort in Faryab Province?

⁷⁵See table 2 for details.

Does the Strategy Promote the Factors Found to be Essential for Interagency Unity of Effort?

Chapter 3 ends by summarizing the factors that are essential for UoE between agencies.⁷⁶ Most important of these are: A common understanding of what is meant by a WoGA; understanding and respect for cultural differences; to have a holistic approach including reverse planning; that organizations and individuals make every effort to achieve UoE and; co-location of agencies.⁷⁷ Although both civilian and military agencies seem to agree on the importance of these factors, they place different emphasis on each. The military is more detail focused and, thus, leans toward a clearly defined and organized system, while civilians have a more general approach. This is clearly an indication of different cultures in agencies and professions. Before entering into the analysis, it is also worth mentioning that the factors promoting UoE apply for all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. In fact, in order successfully to achieve UoE, all levels should strive to incorporate these factors in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. The following analysis is organized around the factors found to promote UoE.

A Holistic Approach, Including Reverse planning

In military terms, a holistic approach means that when planning an operation, one first establishes an understanding of the current situation and defines the desired end-state or goal(s). Then, one makes a plan for how to achieve these desired results. When dealing with a situation that requires direct military action, one divides the operation or campaign

⁷⁶See chapter 3 for more details, 34.

⁷⁷“Reverse planning” means to plan backwards from the point of transitioning to a purely civilian phase of the operation, thus ensuring that military efforts support the overall and civilian goals (In doctrinal terms the transition to phase 5).

into five different phases, generically referred to as “0-Shape, 1-Deter, 2-Seize the Initiative, 3-Dominate, 4-Stabilize, 5-Enable Civil Authority.”⁷⁸ Using a WoGA, each phase must have elements of both civilian and military effort, but the ultimate goal is to end the military engagement as soon as possible and transition to a purely civilian phase 5. Reverse planning means that one begins with planning phase 5 “Enable Civil Authority” in order to ensure that all efforts work, and are coordinated, towards this final phase.

The Norwegian strategy does not describe the situation in Faryab in any detail. It describes the security situation in Faryab as relatively stable except for one specific area.⁷⁹ In addition, the strategy is based on the assumption that the security situation will improve. Based on this assumption, the strategy describes how Norway’s military engagement will change towards mentoring and assisting ANSF. Translated into military terms, the strategy describes the situation in Faryab to be somewhere in phase 4, “Stability Operations,” a situation where most areas are calm, but there are still elements of armed opposition or insurgency to deal with.

The strategy provides a detailed description of what the different agencies will do as the situation transitions into phase 5, “Enable Civil Authority,” but it does not address how civilian and military agencies shall cooperate to reach this phase. Hence, it is somewhat inconsistent with its own description of the situation. It is also relevant to

⁷⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-21; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), V-2.

⁷⁹Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan,” 3, (Gwohrmach district).

notice that it does not address what is to happen if the assumption regarding the improving security situation turns out to be wrong.⁸⁰

The Norwegian strategy describes the reason for being in Afghanistan, the focus areas, and how these focus areas will be addressed. The strategy is also clear on the methodology of Norwegian efforts following the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with UNAMA as the lead agency, and Nordic cooperation.⁸¹ It lays out how the different focus areas will be approached as the security situation improves, but does not cover how civilian and military efforts shall be coordinated to achieve the conditions of phase 5 “Enable Civil Authority” through a WoGA. In the end, the strategy does not describe a holistic approach to the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan.

A Common Understanding of What is Meant by a Whole of Government Approach

Literature covering a WoGA emphasizes the importance that all agencies have a common understanding of the term WoGA. A government that adopts this concept should therefore make clear to all involved parties what is expected of them. The Norwegian strategy does not explain what the term “comprehensive” means in a Norwegian context, nor does it give any reference to other sources or definitions. It is therefore left to the individual reader, or agency, to interpret what the term means for their organization. Hence, a military person would be inclined to interpret the concept

⁸⁰Halvor Harz, Stina Torjesen and Staale Ulriksen, “Visjon eller illusjon i Faryab?” [Vision or illusion in Faryab], *Dagbladet Newspaper*, 26 June 2009, <http://db.no> (accessed 26 June 2009).

⁸¹Cooperation with the Swedish PRT in the neighboring Balkh province in particular.

using military doctrine, while a civilian would use experience and the context of his own ministry. That said, the strategy does emphasize the importance of coordination between civilian and military agencies. Under the headline “Strengthened coordination between civilian and military actors,” the strategy states that “The respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and military actors shall be clearly distinguished, and the coordination between all actors shall be strengthened and their efforts made coherent.”⁸²

As indicated by the quote above, some of the main sections in the strategy are aimed at clarifying roles. By doing so, it tries to improve coordination between civilian and military agencies. However, rather than consistently emphasizing the need for cooperation and setting the stage for this to happen, the defined roles of each agency and the vision of how to organize efforts communicates the exact opposite. Most evident in this regard is that although the strategy recognizes that civil-military cooperation is essential, a sharp division between the two is the ultimate aim. At the same time, the PRT commander and civilian coordinator are directed to find better ways of coordinating their collective efforts. Hence, the strategy is sending mixed messages; sharp division and increased cooperation do not rest easily together, a point the strategy overlooks.

Overall it is difficult to see how the strategy contributes to all agencies having a common understanding of what a comprehensive approach really means for the agencies that are tasked with executing it. The strategic and operational levels are not directed to take steps to set conditions for the comprehensive approach, and, thus, the strategy provides no guidance on structure, organization, and regulations for the efforts. It provides the overall goal and roles for the different agencies, but no specific directions

⁸²Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan,” 2.

for how to coordinate efforts. There is no emphasis on the need for coordinated efforts exceeding the definition of roles in the big picture, other than at the tactical level, which leaves a lot of room for differences between agencies to make themselves felt. In the end it is left to the people on the tactical level to figure out how to go about coordinating efforts: “The Norwegian civilian coordinator and military commander in Faryab, in cooperation with the UN, ISAF and local authorities, shall review how military planning and resource allocation can best be coordinated with civilian plans.”⁸³

Understanding and Respect for Differences in Culture

Both military and civilian sources emphasize the importance of recognizing, understanding and respecting differences between agencies.⁸⁴ In fact, cultural awareness is the starting-point for successful cooperation in a WoGA setting. Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of each agency makes it possible to utilize prior experience, and to define roles and responsibilities in a way that fulfills the purpose of a WoGA. This hopefully results in the maximum, complimentary effect of the combined efforts. There is no recognition in the Norwegian strategy for the constitutional and cultural differences between agencies, and no guidance on how to utilize different capabilities to achieve mutual support and synergy, nor are steps taken to mitigate friction between agencies. That said, information obtained through the interview process suggests that both military and civilian professionals recognize that they have much to gain by learning from and cooperating with each other. For example, civilians recognize the effectiveness of

⁸³Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan,” 3.

⁸⁴Perito, This book is in fact dedicated to facilitate such understanding.

military planning, preparation and execution, and the military personnel see the sensibility of the civilian agencies' long-term approach to sustainable development.⁸⁵ Hence, there is better understanding of the positive impact a more deliberate effort to utilize the expertise of different agencies for a common good would have. However, the strategy does not take steps to facilitate this, on the contrary the emphasis on a sharp division between civilian and military efforts probably works against it.

Organizations and Individuals Should Make Every Effort to Achieve Unity of Effort

Recognizing that in many cases no formal chain of command will exist, and that there is no formalized set of rules guiding the cooperation between agencies, both civilian and military sources state that the commitment of individuals and organizations is the only way of working around challenges regarding interagency cooperation. Although the Norwegian strategy manifests a decided reluctance to formalize relationships between agencies, the fact that there is no mention of the importance of synchronizing the activities of all concerned is a glaring oversight. This is especially true when one considers that unity of action is the key to success. The only exception is the statement that "the coordination between all actors shall be strengthened and their efforts made coherent."⁸⁶ The strategy does not say how this shall be achieved, and thus leaves it up to individuals and organizations to figure out. This approach can hardly be said to promote UoE.

⁸⁵Major Christoffer Knutsen, Electronic interview by author, November 2009; Marstein, interview.

⁸⁶Norwegian Government, "A strategy . . . Afghanistan," 2.

Co-location of Agencies

Leaders such as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker recognize the positive effect of co-location of agencies on cooperation and UoE.⁸⁷ The Norwegian strategy does not promote the need for co-location of military and civilian agencies as a pre-requisite for improved cooperation. To the contrary, it advocates separating the two types of agencies as soon as possible; “the civilian component shall therefore be drawn out of the PRT and linked more closely to the local authorities and to the UN (UNAMA) as soon as the security situation permits.”⁸⁸ The strategy clearly breaks with the concept of co-location. At the same time, the statement is evidence of the lack of a holistic approach alluded to earlier. Instead of focusing on pulling civilian agencies out of the PRT, the strategy should focus on setting the conditions in the security situation where this is possible. A process which encourages agencies to work together as closely as possible helps promote the counterinsurgency effort and security operations, thereby setting the conditions for a transition to phase 5 “Enable Civil Authority.

Conclusion

The strategy only partially addresses the factors that promote UoE, and in some cases, such as co-location of agencies, its recommendations work against it. Most importantly it does not clearly define what is meant by “a comprehensive approach” and “integration of civilian and military efforts.” This situation causes rivalry and perhaps

⁸⁷Crocker; Petraeus, see chapter 3 for details.

⁸⁸Norwegian Government, “A strategy . . . Afghanistan,” 2.

conflicting approaches between the different agencies, and makes it difficult for commanders on the ground to implement the strategy.

The Current Status of Civil-Military Cooperation and Unity of Effort in Faryab Province

Interviews with key personnel with recent experience from the Norwegian efforts in Faryab province comprise the basis of this section.⁸⁹ The interview subjects are from all levels of government, and most of them are military professionals. What follows is a description of their perception of how the Norwegian effort is organized on the different levels, and highlights key challenges regarding Norwegian civil-military cooperation and UoE.

The Strategic Level

The agencies involved in the Norwegian effort in Faryab Province are the Ministries of Defense (MoD), Justice (MoJ), Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Foreign Aid. No formal cooperative interagency mechanisms exist, rather cooperation is voluntary at all levels; strategic, operational and tactical. The main reason for this arrangement is the Norwegian political and administration system. Contrary to other countries' methods of organizing their government, Norwegian Ministers, rather than the Cabinet, are responsible for the actions of their Ministries. Each Minister and Ministry have very clear roles and responsibilities, and interfering in the undertakings of another Ministry is rare. Hence, cooperation between agencies is based on a voluntary, pragmatic, case-by-case

⁸⁹See chapter 2; "Interviews" for details about the interview process.

approach, rather than a formal, systematic continuous effort.⁹⁰ That said, the different agencies realize the importance of synchronizing their efforts in Afghanistan, and agencies hold coordination meetings on a regular basis. The Afghanistan Forum, involving the state secretary level (deputy minister), was established at the initiative of MoD in 2005 in order to bring together all the ministries involved in Afghanistan.⁹¹ However, due to the reasons presented above, there is no “lead agency,” and, apart from the Afghanistan Forum’s so-called “Regjeringsnotater” (Govt. notes used as a basis for cabinet decisions), the 2009 strategy for a comprehensive approach is the only guiding document for coordinating efforts at the strategic level.⁹²

Although based on the good will of the different agencies, there is a general opinion that this system is working quite well, given the Norwegian framework of organizing the government.⁹³ However, there are cases where the ministries disagree on both problems and solutions.⁹⁴ And there are even examples of agencies refusing to coordinate their efforts with the other departments, because they believed that the issue at hand was internal business.⁹⁵ Obviously, a system based on voluntary cooperation will create friction at some point, and there is always the danger of this obstructing effective

⁹⁰Brigadier General Bjoern Tore Solberg, Electronic interview by author, December 2009.

⁹¹de Coning, 26.

⁹²Ibid., 27.

⁹³Solberg, interview.

⁹⁴Fauske, interview.

⁹⁵Knutsen, interview.

UoE on the ground. This limits the possibility of attaining the goals set for the overall effort. Interestingly, there is no coordinating body between the strategic Afghanistan Forum and the PRT in Faryab. There is a sub-element of the Afghanistan Forum in the embassy in Kabul consisting of two MoD personnel and MFA staff, but it has more of a reporting role rather than coordination.⁹⁶ For all practical purposes the different ministries send out individual guidance to their elements in Afghanistan based on their reading of the outcomes of the Afghanistan Forum. This practice causes distorted messages as they pass down through the hierarchy, with a negative effect upon UoE in Faryab.⁹⁷

Funding

Norway's way of organizing efforts in Afghanistan also has a great deal to do with money and funding. Norway has decided that the best way to improve the situation in Afghanistan is to support the build-up of Afghan civilian and military institutions, from the central government down to local levels.⁹⁸ In addition, all efforts are to be coordinated with UNAMA and ISAF. Accompanying this approach is an unwillingness to make Faryab province a "Norwegian problem;" instead it is like the rest of Afghanistan, an Afghan problem to be solved with the assistance of the UN and NATO.⁹⁹ Only by supporting these organizations and the Afghan authorities can sustainable

⁹⁶de Coning, 27.

⁹⁷Ibid., 28.

⁹⁸Norwegian Government, "A strategy . . . Afghanistan," 2.

⁹⁹Knutsen, interview.

solutions be found. Hence, Norway channels 80 percent of its financial aid to Afghanistan directly to the central government; the purpose is to build the capacity of the state from the top down. This means that in order to get financial support to Faryab province, the local government has to compete with the other priorities of the central government. Only 20 percent of Norwegian financial aid is ear-marked for Faryab province. However, the same principle of contribution to development is applied here. All projects are to be executed in close cooperation with provincial and local authorities and UNAMA. The different development projects are suggested and planned by Norwegian civilian officials from the PRT in coordination with local authorities and UNAMA, and funding is then provided by the embassy, which controls the funds. NGOs and local contractors then execute the projects in order to support the local community and businesses in the area. The use of local labor, which is much cheaper than using international or military personnel, means that resources are used efficiently. The decision to keep the military out of development projects is also influenced by the fact that a strict division between civilian and military efforts promotes cooperation with most European countries concerning development and aid.¹⁰⁰ The division probably also fosters a willingness from politicians, international organizations and NGOs to donate civilian money which is critical for the overall efforts in Afghanistan.¹⁰¹

The principles applied to funding makes it difficult for Norway to have the same approach as other countries when it comes to “Quick Impact Projects.” It also makes it very difficult to organize for development and governance to follow military operations

¹⁰⁰Solberg, interview.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

in accordance with the ISAF and NATO concept of “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build.”¹⁰² This is simply because the method of organizing described above does not leave any funds for the Norwegian military to use on projects. The result is that, unlike U.S. commanders, Norwegian military commanders have no funding for so-called “Quick Impact Projects.” In turn, this means that if Norwegian military units in Faryab province are to be able to operate according to the ISAF concept, they are totally dependent on the support and good will of civilian agencies, local government, and UNAMA as the lead agency for development. Adding to the military’s difficulty is that most of the NGOs executing development programs do not want to be associated with military personnel out of a desire to be perceived as being neutral in the conflict.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its definition of aid-funds, so-called OECD Development Aid (ODA), also plays a role when it comes to explaining Norway’s sharp division between civilian and military efforts, and the reluctance to allow quick impact funding to the military. The definition is important because of the goal set, for providing development-aid as a percentage of GDP. Norway has a goal of providing one (1) percent of GDP for development, all of which must meet the ODA criteria. Funds used by military units for development, health, construction and so on do not meet the criteria for ODA,¹⁰³ while the same activities conducted by civilians do.¹⁰⁴ It is natural for Norway to use civilians to as large a degree as possible, as

¹⁰²Knutsen, interview. The concept behind Shape-Clear-Hold-Build is described later in the chapter, see subheading “Tactical level.” For further details see *PRT Handbook*, 6.

¹⁰³There are some exceptions, like construction materials and the actual vaccine.

¹⁰⁴Solberg, interview.

this will fit her overall international policy.¹⁰⁵ Another aspect is that NGOs would view allocation of development funds to the military as competition for resources. This aspect is recognized by authorities, and there is no desire to have the NGOs compete with government agencies, because such a situation is thought to be less effective and leads to bad publicity.¹⁰⁶

The Operational Level

The operational level of the military plays only a very small part in the Norwegian operations in Faryab province, and the operations in Afghanistan as a whole. This situation however is only natural, since the military forces are detached to ISAF, and thus are under ISAF and Regional Command (RC) North command. Hence, the Norwegian National Headquarters plays more of a supporting and monitoring role, primarily to ensure that the use of Norwegian forces is compliant with guidelines given by the Norwegian government. For this purpose they monitor activities from Norway, and have a forward element, the National Contingent Commander (NCC), collocated with RC North Staff in Mazar-e-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan. The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, on the other hand, plays a more active role. Contrary to some other countries methods of organizing, the embassy is not in charge of Norway's overall efforts in Afghanistan. It is only responsible for overseeing and coordinating civilian efforts. However, the embassy cannot order subjects of ministries other than Foreign Affairs to do anything. This absence of a lead agency means that military units report to ISAF and

¹⁰⁵See chapter 3 for details on Norway's overall international policy.

¹⁰⁶Solberg, interview.

are monitored by Norwegian National Headquarters via the NCC, while civilian agencies report to their own departments with the embassy in Kabul coordinating and monitoring efforts.¹⁰⁷

This way of organizing results from Norway's view that UNAMA is to be the lead agency in Afghanistan, with ISAF in support. Norwegian civilian agencies on the ground are therefore supposed to coordinate efforts in accordance with UNAMA plans.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, since military forces are detached to ISAF, they are to follow orders in the chain of command. In a perfect world UNAMA and ISAF efforts would be coordinated at all levels. Thus, following this principle of organizing Norwegian efforts, UoE on the ground would follow as a consequence. However, friction between UN and NATO and lack of coordination and incompetence within the UN system, means that this is not the case in Faryab province.¹⁰⁹ Lack of coordination, at least at the higher tactical and lower operational levels between UNAMA and ISAF, means that coordination of military and civilian efforts largely are left to the lower tactical levels; the PRT and the civilian coordinators, in cooperation with neighboring ISAF units, local level UNAMA officials, local Afghan authorities and ANSF commanders. In the end, there is very little operational level guidance and direction given to the Norwegian military and civilian tactical level organizations other than strategic level documents like ANDS, the *PRT Handbook*, and the Norwegian 2009 strategy. As a result it is left to them to

¹⁰⁷Confirmed by several sources: de Coning, 28; Knutsen, interview; LtCol Ivar Knotten, Electronic interview by author, November 2009; Marstein, interview.

¹⁰⁸Norwegian Government, "A strategy . . . Afghanistan," 2; Major Steinar Dahl, Electronic interview by author, January 2010; Knutsen, interview.

¹⁰⁹Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview; Solberg, interview.

operationalize the strategies and reach strategic goals. The previously discussed possibility for different interpretations of what a comprehensive approach means, together with sometimes differing guidelines from the different ministries, and the poorly synchronized efforts of UNAMA and NATO, are undoubtedly sources of friction when it comes to achieving UoE.

The Tactical Level

Most agree that cooperation between agencies within the PRT is good, has improved over the years, and is in fact constantly improving.¹¹⁰ However, the cooperation and coordination of efforts is totally dependent on personal relationships and the willingness of individuals to achieve complimentary and reinforcing effects. Fortunately this willingness to work towards UoE has been present both with military and civilian officials over the last couple of years. Nevertheless, there have been cases when cooperation has been very difficult because of personal views on how efforts should be organized.¹¹¹ Thus, coordination of efforts has in some periods been all but absent.

Another factor that influences cooperation and UoE at the tactical level is the different time perspectives under which military and civilian agencies operate. Civilian agencies work in a 6 to 15 year perspective, while military units tend to focus on their 6 month tours.¹¹² To further complicate matters, guidance and direction from ISAF and RC North is very broad. Often the ISAF issued *PRT Handbook* has been the only guiding

¹¹⁰Interviews, all subjects agree.

¹¹¹Dahl, interview.

¹¹²Colonel Leif Petter Sommersteth, Eelectronic interview by author, December 2009; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview; Marstein, interview.

document, leaving it up to the PRT commander to determine how he wants to go about his business. This means that operations can be tailored to the conditions in the different provinces, a pre-requisite for success in Afghanistan. However, it also means that operations in Faryab does not necessarily follow an overall campaign plan. The concept under which military operations have been conducted by the Norwegian PRT has therefore varied a great deal from contingent to contingent based on the commander's assessment of the situation and his interpretation of what is to be achieved.¹¹³ Some contingents have therefore followed the principle that the PRTs should not engage in military operations at all, but have purely a coordinating role between military and civilian efforts. Some have engaged in regular combat operations, while others have operated using special operations and clandestine operations.¹¹⁴ The different time perspectives, the lack of an overall concept or campaign plan, and the subsequent variations in operational concepts and areas of priority has undoubtedly contributed to differences in understanding, goals and approaches. Difficulties in coordinating civilian and military efforts in the province have been the result.¹¹⁵

Military personnel particularly are somewhat frustrated with the lack of guidance and formal organization of Norway's effort.¹¹⁶ This is, at least partially, do to military culture, and the way military personnel are used to operating. They want a clear cut

¹¹³FM 3-07, 4-1 to 4-4.

¹¹⁴Knutsen, interview.

¹¹⁵Marstein, interview.

¹¹⁶Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview; Sommerseth, interview.

formal approach that leads to measurable results, without depending on someone else's willingness to cooperate. They find the civilian approach to be too general and difficult to assess. Civilians on the other hand, are quite content with the current situation. They feel that UoE is being achieved in a "good enough" way, simply because civilians and military agencies have the same overall goal. The sharp division between military and civilian actors is a natural result of the two working along different lines of effort supporting an overarching stability project.¹¹⁷ There is therefore no need for civilians and the military to conduct coordinated operations together. That said, the civilians recognize that there is much to learn from military effectiveness and efficiency when it comes to planning, preparing, executing and assessing efforts.¹¹⁸

Hence, there are fundamental differences between military and civilian personnel when it comes to views on the need for formal integration and synchronization of efforts. Based on these different perceptions of the level of coordination needed, it is clear that there is no common understanding of what a comprehensive, or WoGA means at the tactical level, something which is a fundamental pre-requisite for achieving UoE.

When it comes to planning, preparing, executing and assessing at the tactical level in the PRT, civilian and military officials adapt the best they can in order to achieve UoE. Missing guidance from Norway, except from the individual departments, combined with the limited ISAF guidance regarding the PRT, and to a lesser extent orders from RC

¹¹⁷Marstein, interview.

¹¹⁸Petter Bauk, Arne Strand, Mohammad Hakim and Arghawan Akbari, "Afghanistan: An Assessment of Conflict and Actors in Faryab Province to Establish a Basis for Increased Norwegian Civilian Involvement," Christian Mikkelsens Institutt, 2007:1, 9-10; Marstein, interview.

North, means that there is a lot of room for the PRT to decide on what to do.¹¹⁹ The PRT is therefore trying to coordinate efforts by conducting daily and weekly coordinating meetings with all involved agencies present. As mentioned previously, both civilians and military personnel think this is working quite well.

At the same time, however, there are some obstacles in achieving unity of action- and effort. The meetings ensure that everyone has the same situational understanding, and that there exists an agreement of the need for a common approach and overall plan.¹²⁰ However, there are differences in how to approach problems and challenges, and most agencies have specific guidance from parent organizations. This conflicting guidance sometimes prevents them from taking part in a comprehensive approach.¹²¹

These differences have so far made it impossible to agree on a common campaign plan, which coordinate civilian and military efforts with the purpose of influencing the common situational understanding towards an end-state. Differences in approach to planning and execution are accompanied by different, or non existing, ways of assessing progress. While military efforts are assessed in accordance with ISAF methodology, no common procedures for assessing civilian or overall (civil-military) progress and success exist. Attempts have been made to correct this, but so far nothing has been done to formalize a method for assessing the overall outcome of efforts.¹²² This inability to agree on an overall campaign-plan means that cooperation and UoE occur on an *ad hoc* basis,

¹¹⁹Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview; Sommerseth, interview.

¹²⁰Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview.

¹²¹Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview.

¹²²Dahl, interview.

something which indicates that the Norwegian efforts lack the holistic approach needed to coordinate the various players' actions in a complimentary way over time.

The *ad hoc* nature of cooperation and coordination, combined with the different time perspective under which civilian and military agencies operate, means that very limited possibilities exist to coordinate and provide the civilian efforts needed to execute the “build” phase of the ISAF concept of “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build”¹²³. The concept is based on a process of first shaping an area controlled by insurgents through information operations etc, then, clearing the area of insurgents using military force. This is followed by securing the area from insurgents using security forces and finally stabilizing the area by building local government, security forces, civil institutions and businesses. The concept is based in the premise that civilian agencies follow in the tracks of military units in order to have a quick positive impact, thereby persuading the population to turn away from the insurgents and side with the legitimate government.¹²⁴

Norway's approach does, in practical terms mean that efforts are to be coordinated by, with and through ISAF and UNAMA. As a result the level of UoE rest on the ability of these two organizations to coordinate their efforts. So far this has not been the case, and together with the very limited opportunities given to the military to conduct development projects, it has made it very difficult for Norwegian military units in the PRT to follow the ISAF concept. One example is when RC North ordered an operation in

¹²³*PRT Handbook*,6.

¹²⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office December 2006), 5-18 to 5-22; Commander ISAF, *PRT Handbook*; Commander ISAF, “ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance,” August 2009.

the Gwohrmach district, where military timelines were not synchronized with the time it would take for UNAMA and Norwegian development effort to be ready. Although the PRT requested a postponement of the operation, it was launched by RC North without the possibility of a build phase.¹²⁵

The inability of Norwegian military units to conduct operations in accordance with the ISAF concept is an indicator that the Norwegian way of organizing efforts in Faryab is not aligned to the ISAF approach. This creates difficulties for the tactical level when conducting operations since Norwegian military units are under ISAF command. This is clearly a problem, since Norway's stated concept of military operations is to operate in accordance with the overall ISAF campaign plan.

Conclusion

Based on the testimony of the interview subjects, cooperation and coordination of civilian and military efforts in Faryab is working quite well, especially at the strategic and tactical level. The good cooperation is not a result of the way Norway has organized the efforts, but rather is a result of individuals' and organizations' willingness to engage in cooperation. This is a testimony that confirms the validity of one of the factors found to be essential to achieving UoE: Organizations and individuals make every effort to strive towards UoE through personal commitment.¹²⁶ That said, the interview subjects point to several areas that stand in the way of UoE.

¹²⁵Knotten, interview.

¹²⁶See chapter 3, "Literature Review" for details.

First, there is no common understanding of what a comprehensive approach really means for the involved ministries, as there is a fundamental disagreement on what a comprehensive approach means in practical terms between civilian and military agencies and officials. Second, there is no holistic approach in the form of operational level coordination and an overall campaign plan. This contributes, at least in part, to the failure at the tactical level to agree on how to go about solving the problems in Faryab, despite the fact that all agencies share a common understanding of the situation.

Second, the absence of a comprehensive campaign plan, and differing opinions on how to solve the problems, leads to the civilian and military agencies operating along separate lines of effort. As an example, the civilians do not think that there is a correlation between security, stability and development, rather they are of the opinion that development simply leads to development, an opinion which stands in sharp contrast to the ISAF “shape-clear-hold-build” concept adopted by the military.¹²⁷ At the same time, the missing campaign plan means that there is no coordinated effort to facilitate the successful completion of, in military terms, phase 4, “Stability Operations,” and make the transition to phase 5, “Enable Civil Authority.”

The third issue is related to the difference in opinion about development; there are contradicting guidelines passed down from the different ministries and ISAF. Tactical levels are caught in the middle of a struggle between Norwegian policies and the ISAF approach because the Norwegian effort is not aligned to the ISAF operations concept.

¹²⁷Marstein, interview.

Does the Strategy Address the Challenges Concerning Unity of Effort Revealed Through Interviews?

The overarching challenges with achieving UoE found when analyzing the information provided through interviews are to a large extent related to the factors found to be universally important in order to achieve UoE. As such, the findings in the interviews only strengthen the conclusions of the literature studies, and confirm their applicability to Norwegian conditions. Since the question to be answered in this section is whether the Norwegian strategy addresses the challenges found through interviews, and the challenges are the same as the factors found in literature to promote UoE, the answers provided in the first part of this section are also valid here.¹²⁸ Overall, the strategy addresses some of the challenges, but not in enough detail to improve the possibility of UoE.

In addition to the challenges that correlate to the factors found to promote UoE, the findings in the interviews describes nuances specific to Norway's engagement in Faryab, as well as other problem areas that were not encountered as part of the study of literature. These include the differences in perspective about development; the imposed restrictions on the military's possibility for conducting development projects; and the apparent lack of synchronization of the Norwegian and the ISAF approach to counterinsurgency. The reasons and origins for these differences and challenges might be found in the influence of foreign policy, domestic politics and concerned interest-groups in Norway. The last section of this chapter will attempt to shed light on what may have influenced the Norwegian approach this way.

¹²⁸See page 52 for conclusion of the first part of the chapter.

Conclusion

Does then the Norwegian strategy promote the factors that lead to UoE? Based on the analysis of information provided through interviews, including challenges for achieving UoE, and the comparison of these challenges and the factors found in literature to promote UoE to the Norwegian strategy, it is clear that the strategy does not promote the factors that lead to UoE to a large enough extent for a positive impact on achieving unity of action and UoE in Faryab province.

Influence of Politics and Consequences for the Strategy and Possibility for Unity of Effort

This section analyzes the origins of the new strategy. More precisely, by looking at the impact of foreign and domestic policies revealed in chapter 3 that influenced the strategy. It attempts to uncover how the characteristics of Norwegian foreign policy of “Maximizing international influence” through international organizations, peace negotiations, traditional perceptions of Norway’s and the military’s roles, and the special relationships with non-state actors have influenced the Norwegian approach towards Faryab province in Afghanistan. It analyzes how these factors have affected the strategy and in turn the possibility of UoE, thereby answering the secondary research question: To what extent have the principles and compromises in politics and cultural differences influenced the strategy, and how will this influence the probability for achieving UoE?

First of all, taking responsibility for Faryab province has forced the Norwegian government to address a whole set of new challenges. The role as “lead nation” in Faryab, with the PRT under NATO/ISAF command is hard to reconcile with Norwegians’ self perceptions as peace builders, since NATO has clearly taken sides in

the conflict and is fighting a counterinsurgency. With the role as “lead nation” in the province comes the expectation to take charge and get results; hence Norway has been forced to take a role traditionally held by larger nations and is more visible in the international landscape. While this might seem to fit with the traditional aim of “maximizing influence,” it breaks with Norway’s traditional policy and principle of being a part of and supporting the UN, rather than complimenting it as is the case in Faryab.¹²⁹ The struggle to adapt to this new circumstance, while staying loyal to traditional principles, is clearly visible in the Norwegian 2009 strategy as it makes every effort to emphasize the role of the international organizations in general and UNAMA’s leading role in particular.

Second, and perhaps most influential on the Norwegian Strategy, is the special relationship between Norwegian state and non-state actors in foreign policy. This relationship between organizations and individuals has undoubtedly influenced Norway’s policies towards Afghanistan and the chosen method of a comprehensive WoGA. The WoGA in itself is about integrating government agencies towards a common goal, and thus NGOs and research institutes should have little say in the matter, even if they add pressure as an interest group. However, in Norway, the MFA has made it an explicit goal to use NGOs, often as implementing partners in the development, humanitarian, research

¹²⁹de Coning, 22.

and capacity building fields, in its foreign policy actions.¹³⁰ This is also the method used for development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan.¹³¹

This integration, when pursued in Afghanistan, has the possibility of making NGOs appear as being part of the apparatus of the Norwegian Government, and thus be in conflict with their principle of neutrality. In fact, most complaints from NGOs and civilian personnel have been directed at the use of military escorts and the military assisting development.¹³² Therefore, in a WoGA in Afghanistan, with fully integrated civilian and military efforts, the prominent role of the military is likely to have a negative effect on the special relationship between the Norwegian government and NGOs. Further adding to this picture, Norway in the past has not been negatively associated with pursuing major-power national interests, making it easier for NGOs to cooperate with Norway.¹³³ However, as Norway takes the lead in Faryb province militarily in a US led operation originating from the “Global War on Terror,” this may no longer be the case. This could remove some of the small state advantages previously enjoyed by Norway, resulting in a situation which may negatively affect the Norway/NGO relationship to an even larger degree.

The described danger of operations in Afghanistan disrupting Norway’s long time special relationship with non-state actors is what seems to have influenced the strategy

¹³⁰Ibid., 23.

¹³¹Colonel Morten Kolbjoernsen, Electronic interview by author, November 2009; Dahl, interview; Marstein, interview.

¹³²Bauk, 17.

¹³³de Coning, 28.

most. The contradictory decision to have a clear distinction between civilian and military efforts, improving cooperation, and integrating all activities must be a result of wanting to keep this relationship in the future. After studying reports from research agencies that were published prior to the 2009 Strategy, it seems like the Christian Mikkelsen's Institute report "Afghanistan: An Assessment of Conflict and Actors in Faryab Province to Establish a Basis for Increased Norwegian Civilian Involvement," has been particularly influential in the development of the strategy.¹³⁴ This report is very clear on stating that the practice of mixing military forces and civilian personnel in the PRT is unfortunate and should stop. To support its argument, the report mentions examples of military units escorting civilian medical personnel, the co-location of civilian and military agencies, and the refusal of NGOs to meet at the military run PRT.¹³⁵ However, the report fails to provide any rationale as to why this is unfortunate; instead it takes it for granted that everybody would agree that military and civilian efforts should be separated. The report goes on to recommend a sharp division between civilian and military efforts, as well as pulling the civilian element out of the PRT as soon as possible.¹³⁶ The Strategy has embraced these recommendations which are clearly aimed at maintaining the special relationship with non-state actors, even though they are contrary to the essence of a WoGA, the *PRT Handbook*, the practice of other nations and the factors that lead to UoE.

Third, the change in military operations towards combat operations and a more offensive role in the insurgency fight in Faryab, might be perceived as breaking with the

¹³⁴Bauk.

¹³⁵Bauk, 17.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, 36.

traditional view of the military's role, and further alter the perception of the Norwegian populace's idea of Norway as a peace loving nation, thus negatively influencing popular support of the war.¹³⁷ The strategy is very vague on the use of military force, and there seems to be a reluctance to portray any military action as anything but support to ANSF. There is no mentioning of the efforts to neutralize the Taliban or others insurgent and criminal elements.¹³⁸ Instead the strategy is based on the assumption that the security situation will improve, and when it does, the military effort will transition towards liaison efforts and mentoring ANSF, a role which is much more in line with Norwegian popular sentiments.

Interestingly a report from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs states that the Norwegian military prefers not to engage in traditional CIMIC tasks, such as development and other support.¹³⁹ This finding is quite contrary to current doctrine, and in fact how military officers interviewed see their role.¹⁴⁰ In fact, many of the officers interviewed are frustrated because they are not allowed to execute or participate in development projects because this is to be a purely civilian task.¹⁴¹ They are particularly frustrated because this restriction makes it very difficult to conduct operations according to the ISAF concept of "Shape-Clear-Hold-Build."

¹³⁷de Coning, 23.

¹³⁸Norwegian Government, "A strategy . . . Afghanistan," 2-4.

¹³⁹de Coning, 22.

¹⁴⁰FM 3-24 and FM 3-07.

¹⁴¹Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview.

Conclusion

To what extent then have the principles and compromises in politics and cultural differences influenced the strategy? And how will this influence the probability for achieving UoE? There is neither doubt nor surprise that Norway's overall foreign policy approach, domestic policy concerns and the interests of special interest groups have influenced the Norwegian strategy to a large extent. It would appear that Norway's emphasis on support of international institutions, traditions, public-support considerations, and funding, have all affected the final strategy. In turn, the approach taken has had an impact on the possibility of achieving UoE. However, what seems to have affected the strategy most is the desire to continue the special relationship between the Norwegian government, research institutes and NGOs. This aim has made the government approach engagement in Afghanistan in a way that is fundamentally different from the way most other nations view the concept of WoGA by insisting on keeping a sharp division between civilian and military efforts. As shown in the first section of this chapter, this division will have a negative effect on cooperation and the ability to achieve UoE by civilian and military actors.

Chapter 5 will attempt to summarize the analysis of this chapter into an overall conclusion as it attempts to answer the primary research question. It will also present possible ways of achieving UoE in spite of the challenges described in this chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Studies of literature, theory and doctrine regarding civil-military cooperation reveal that there is a set of factors that increase the chance of achieving UoE. Applied appropriately, these factors lead to an effective WoGA in a complex operational environment. The factors are: (1) a common understanding of what is meant by a WoGA, (2) an understanding and respect for differences in culture, (3) a holistic approach including reverse planning, (4) a shared commitment by organizations and individuals to achieve UoE, and (5) the co-location of agencies.¹⁴² Theory does not distinguish between the different levels of operations, but rather implies the validity of the factors on all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Interestingly, both civilian and military writers agree on the factors, but they put different emphasis on each. Civilians tend to highlight the importance of understanding differences between agencies and have a more general approach to the subject, while military sources are more detail focused and emphasize the need for systematic formal cooperation between agencies.

Since the body of literature concerning Norwegian interagency relations and UoE is relatively small, the author conducted a series of interviews to provide information about interagency cooperation in a Norwegian context. Through their answers, key personnel provided insight into the current status of civil-military cooperation as well as the challenges in terms of achieving UoE in Faryab province. Overall, there is agreement

¹⁴²See chapter 3 for details.

that cooperation between the agencies is working quite well, and that important progress is being made in the province. However, the military personnel interviewed laid special emphasis upon the point that this is despite rather than because of the current way of organizing.¹⁴³ All interview subjects relate the relative success of voluntary coordination between organizations, leadership, and personal commitment to UoE. Hence, the importance of individual commitment as one of the most important factors promoting UoE is highlighted.¹⁴⁴

The main obstacles to achieving UoE in Faryab province and thereby an effective WoGA are: (1) a fundamental difference in the understanding of what a comprehensive approach means in practical terms between civilian and military agencies and officials; (2) a lack of operational-level coordination, including the absence of an overall campaign plan. (This contributes to the failure to agree at the tactical level on how to go about solving the problems in Faryab, and leads the civilian and military agencies to follow different timelines and separate lines of effort); and (3) a difference of opinion about the relationship of development and stability/security (This causes contradicting guidelines to be passed down from the different ministries and ISAF). In sum, tactical levels are caught in the middle of a struggle between Norwegian policies and the ISAF approach, because the Norwegian approach is not aligned to the ISAF operations concept.

Interestingly, the challenges listed above correlate with the factors essential for achieving UoE. Since both the challenges and success in interagency cooperation

¹⁴³Dahl, interview; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview; Sommerseth, interview.

¹⁴⁴Supported by Petreaus; Crocker, and theory described in chapter 3.

revealed by the interview subjects are related to the factors promoting UoE, they confirm the factors' validity both in general and for Norwegian conditions specifically.¹⁴⁵

There is no doubt that Norwegian domestic and overall foreign policies have influenced the 2009 strategy in ways that affect the possibility for UoE. Norway's emphasis on support of international institutions, foreign policy traditions, public-support considerations, and funding, have all influenced the strategy. The desire to continue the special relationship between the Norwegian government, research institutes and NGOs has affected the strategy the most. This aim has influenced the Norwegian Government to approach the engagement in Afghanistan in a way that is fundamentally different from the way other nations view the concept of WoGA. Norway insists on making a sharp distinction between civilian and military efforts; this division has had a negative effect on cooperation and thus the ability to achieve UoE between civilian and military actors.

Can the 2009 Norwegian strategy for comprehensive civilian and military efforts in Faryab Province lead to improved cooperation and UoE? In the end, the strategy does not promote the factors found in literature as leading to UoE, nor does it take steps towards mitigating the challenges facing UoE identified through interviews. The main reason for this is the influence that Norwegian overall foreign policy concerns and traditions have had on the strategy; clearly efficiency in Afghanistan is a lesser priority when viewed in this context. The strategy will not lead to improved UoE in Faryab.¹⁴⁶ However, it might still have a positive effect on civil-military cooperation, because of the process leading up to it. The discussion, knowledge sharing and awareness provided to

¹⁴⁵See chapter 4, first section, for details.

¹⁴⁶All interview subjects agree on this.

organizations and individuals through this process and through the debate after the strategy's release have set the stage for better interagency cooperation by providing insight on cultural differences, the concept of a WoGA, political considerations, and not the least, the importance of UoE.¹⁴⁷

Recommendations

Recommendations for Achieving Unity of Effort

As mentioned above, the Norwegian way of organizing efforts in Afghanistan is proof that a large degree of UoE can be achieved voluntarily by organizations and individuals through personal commitment. At the same time, there are many who see the Norwegian approach as being too general. In particular, the operational and tactical levels see the relatively effective cooperation as being in spite of the way things are organized, and attribute challenges in interagency cooperation and coordination to a lack of formalization.¹⁴⁸ To have an effective WoGA that is coordinated with that of UNAMA and ISAF, Norway's "comprehensive approach" should change from the current method of voluntary *ad hoc* based coordination towards a more formalized approach. Included in this should be specific guidelines and an explanation of what a WoGA means in a Norwegian Context.

The first issue that should be addressed is Norway's overall approach to engaging in conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan. Based upon the literature covering Norway's overall foreign policy, it appears that the traditional ways of organizing efforts do not

¹⁴⁷An effect emphasized by Solberg, interview.

¹⁴⁸Dahl, interview; Kolbjoernsen, interview; Knutsen, interview; Knotten, interview; Sommerseth, interview.

match the situation in Afghanistan, or any future involvement in similar conflicts. Norway should take steps to develop a generic strategy for dealing with foreign engagement that does not necessarily follow old foreign policy traditions. This idea has also been proposed by researchers from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. In their report, they suggest that Norway develop a generic strategy for dealing with circumstances similar to Afghanistan; broad enough to be flexible, narrow enough to provide guidance to the operational and tactical levels.¹⁴⁹ Such a strategy should take into account the challenges uncovered in this paper, and perhaps more importantly, make it clear to all agencies what is meant by a WoGA in a Norwegian context.

Having an overall general strategy in place, the second issue to be addressed is to adapt this strategy to Afghanistan's specific conditions in order to provide guidance for the operational and tactical levels. This guidance would in turn enable these levels to establish an overall campaign plan based on the conditions on the ground. The campaign plan should be based on a holistic approach, using reverse planning from a completely civilian phase. That way it would help to ensure that military operations are synchronized with long-term objectives. The campaign plan should also be synchronized with UNAMA, GIRoA and ISAF for maximum effectiveness. At the same time, it should take into consideration the somewhat unique relationship between Norwegian civilian agencies and the military. The purpose is to integrate the efforts of all agencies, including the military, with the aim of maximizing positive effects in Afghanistan, while at the same time avoiding negative impact on other Norwegian foreign policy aims. A more

¹⁴⁹de Coning, 5.

formal approach to cooperation seems necessary in order to set the tactical level up for success in the context of a WoGA.

That said, such a strategy will be both difficult to agree upon and take a long time to develop given the political implications. It might even prove impossible because there is currently very little political and civilian will to take steps towards a more formalized organization of efforts in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁰ In an interview following the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs recommendation for the development of a new whole of government strategy, State Secretary Espen Barth Eide from the MoD stated that there was no need for such a strategy as the current approach was functioning well.¹⁵¹

Based on the interviews, it is clear that the tactical level has a different perception than the State Secretary, and that everything is not working as well as it should concerning UoE. Agencies, organizations and individuals must therefore find ways of improving cooperation without the help of their political masters. All agencies should seek to improve the current situation by streamlining the voluntary commitment to UoE. The focus should be on the ability to “thrive in chaos” and to work around problems.¹⁵² In order to do this, people must understand the system that they operate within. Currently, there seems to be limited knowledge on many levels as to how and why the government thinks and acts the way it does in Afghanistan. This is not only the case with military and

¹⁵⁰Solberg, interview.

¹⁵¹Anonymous, “Et langsiktig og helhetlig perspektiv” [A long-term, comprehensive perspective], Ministry of Defense homepage, 26 February 2010, <http://regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2010/har-er-langsiktig-helhetlig-perspektiv-i-Afghainistan.html?id=594176> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹⁵²An approach held as the most productive one by Solberg, interview.

civilian professionals, but also in the public debate about foreign affairs in general and Afghanistan in particular.¹⁵³

Policies and strategy are inevitably influenced by the perceptions of the Norwegian public in general. The inaccuracy of the public debate in Norway, combined with the reluctance of the government to address the military aspect of the engagement and the fact that Norway has taken sides in the conflict is bound to influence the public perception and in turn the strategy in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁴ A larger degree of accuracy when discussing Afghanistan should therefore be the goal of all involved in the debate. It might not improve the possibility of success in Afghanistan, but at least the people and their politicians will be able to make informed decisions.

In order to make the most out of the current way of organizing efforts in Afghanistan, a high level of honesty and accuracy is even more important when briefing and informing military and civilian professionals assigned to positions in Faryab province. Leaders in the different agencies at the strategic and operational levels must take charge and vigorously communicate their views both within their organizations and to those with whom they are to cooperate. At the same time, the consequences of Norway's overall foreign policy for the efforts in Afghanistan must be explained to the tactical level. For example, the PRT leadership should be aware of why the Norwegian approach to the integration of civilian agencies in operations is different than that of

¹⁵³Ole Asbjørn Fauske, "Debatten om Afghanistan savner kunnskap"[The debate about Afghanistan lacks knowledge], *Adresseavisas Newspaper*, 3 February 2010, <http://adresseavisa.no/meninger> (accessed 3 February 2010).

¹⁵⁴The Norwegian Government have a tradition of being very reluctant of admitting that Norway is at war. This has also been the case with Afghanistan.

ISAF, and given guidance accordingly. If necessary, this can be done through the use of classified information, thus avoiding unwanted effects on the message the Norwegian government wants to send to different audiences. Just as important is the need for the operational and tactical levels to communicate how Norway's approach is influencing the likelihood for success on the ground. Only by listening to their subordinates can decision-makers take steps to improve the situation. The functions of cooperation, coordination and collaboration should be applied throughout the chain of command and in all agencies.

The fact that Norway has chosen a WoGA as a concept for dealing with Afghanistan, and the fact that there is no common understanding as of what this means, makes it critical to point out the necessity of educating the people assigned to execute the concept. Assuming that the WoGA, will also be used in future operations, it should become a part of the curriculum of institutions such as the Military Academy, Police Academy, and the Diplomat Course. Education should focus on Norwegian foreign policy, and on the way the different agencies operate, specifically their culture, capabilities, organization, and limitations.¹⁵⁵ A broad understanding of how politics influences military operations in a Norwegian context, and knowledge about the different government agencies, will make it easier for professionals at the operational and tactical levels to find practical solutions consistent with political considerations, and make the most of a given situation. Brigadier General Bjorn Tore Solberg made the following comment when asked about the relationship between civilian and military organizations:

We say that there is no military solution, when doing so we must accept that what is needed is a political solution. Political solutions means to achieve what is possible, which often is not the best solution, or the logical solution. To

¹⁵⁵The need for mutual understanding is emphasized by Marstein, interview.

quote Clausewitz saying that military power is the continuation of politics, without understanding what politics are, is therefore quite pointless. Unfortunately there are many who try to do the opposite; make politics into logical use of military power, the way they have been taught it should be-logical, predictable and easy to explain.¹⁵⁶

In addition to include a WoGA in the curriculum of schools, individuals in agencies that might be involved in future interagency engagements should be a part of training and exercises held at, for example, the Norwegian Command and Staff College. The purpose of this type of education should be mutual respect and understanding, a prerequisite for achieving UoE.¹⁵⁷ Just as with information, education and training for interagency operations is important for those deploying to Afghanistan. The same focus on understanding overall policy and the capabilities and limitations of the involved agencies should therefore be an integral part of pre-deployment training. Pre-deployment training and exercises should involve members of all involved agencies in order to set the tactical level up for success.

Given that cooperation between agencies most probably will remain voluntary and be based on individuals' willingness and ability to communicate, coordinate and collaborate, careful consideration should go into appointing leaders involved in a WoGA. Much of the American effectiveness in Iraq is due to the extraordinary cooperation between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and they themselves emphasize the importance of having the right personalities.¹⁵⁸ An important element in their success was the seniority of the two, which enabled them to make themselves heard in their

¹⁵⁶Solberg, interview.

¹⁵⁷Rietjens and Perito.

¹⁵⁸Crocker; Petraeus.

organizations. Also, Norwegian leaders should not only have good inter-personal skills, but be senior enough to have a say in their organization and be able to make decisions on the ground.¹⁵⁹ Experience from Faryab province so far has proven that sound leadership is a key to achieving UoE in spite of the existing challenges.

Recommendations for Further Research

Research has revealed that Norway's foreign policy is partially based on a tradition originating from the Cold War era.¹⁶⁰ New challenges resulted from Norway's engagement in Afghanistan and, at the same time, many are advocating a return to the former practice of UN-based peacekeeping missions and the need for NATO to re-focus on the aspect of mutual defense as opposed to so-called "out of area" operations.¹⁶¹ It is common among Norwegian politicians to state that Norwegian foreign policy is a constant. However, rather than accepting this statement, it would be interesting to examine what foreign policies would benefit Norway in the long run when pursuing the goal of "maximum international influence." Is the cry for a return to former practices an effort to make reality fit a traditional Norwegian framework, or is it the best way to gain influence? Do Afghanistan and similar conflicts present opportunities that should be taken advantage of by changing the policy to some extent? What would be the best direction for securing Norway's interests in an ever changing international environment

¹⁵⁹Knutsen, interview. Civilian officials' opinions have been ignored by their superiors at home.

¹⁶⁰de Coning, 19-22.

¹⁶¹de Coning, 25. And also an opinion associated with the left side of Norwegian politics.

(Climate change, increased focus on the Arctic, natural resources being a few areas to consider)? In short, what could be gained and what could be lost by adapting or changing foreign policies?

A part of this topic is the sentiments of the Norwegian public. As mentioned in the paper, foreign policy is influenced by the sentiments of the population, among them the perception of Norway as a “peace nation” and the public’s view of the traditional role of the military. How true and how unchangeable are these sentiments? Will the population be unable to accept a foreign policy change based on *realpolitik*, even if it breaks with traditional principles? Equally interesting is the relationship with the NGOs; what would happen to this relationship in the case of a policy change that would bring Norway’s WoGA closer to that of her allies? Is there a middle ground to be found with the NGOs? In this context, it is interesting that the NGOs that were not willing to work with the PRT in Faryab province were Norwegian; other GO/NGOs did not share the same unwillingness to work with the PRT. Nevertheless, they were able to operate in a way that distinguished them from the PRT throughout the province.¹⁶²

The outcome from the above mentioned topics might very well be that the current foreign policy is the best one possible given Norway’s specific circumstances. It would then be interesting to look into how to achieve UoE within this context. What characterizes the cultures and procedures of the different ministries and how can these be utilized to create a methodology for establishing a comprehensive holistic approach in Afghanistan without hampering the willingness and effectiveness of the different agencies?

¹⁶²Sommerseth, interview.

Other topics for future research that have come up during this research are:

(1) What is the perception of the Afghan population when it comes to the question of NGO neutrality? How would a change in relations between civilian and military agencies affect it? Can it be that western NGOs are perceived to be operating together with western governments? (2) What effect does development have on stability and security? This is an important question since there is a difference in opinion between Norwegian civilian agencies and the military and ISAF on this point. (3) What will happen when larger amounts of other nation's troops start working in Faryab? At least 1,000 troops from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division arrived in the beginning of February 2010 to work with ANSF.¹⁶³ Will this force a change in the way Norway approaches civil-military relations?

Closing

The 2009 Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive approach will not in itself lead to UoE and an effective WoGA. However, the process leading up to it and the discussion it has provoked might have a positive impact on interagency cooperation because it makes people and organizations consider the importance of UoE for success in Faryab province. Nevertheless, this paper recommends that Norway's WoGA should be formalized through a generic strategy for this kind of foreign engagement, and that a holistic campaign-plan that is synchronized with GIRoA, UNAMA and ISAF should be implemented for Faryab province. At the same time the paper recognizes that, at least for

¹⁶³Staale Ulriksen, "Fare, fare, Faryab!" [Danger, Danger, Faryab!], *Aftenposten Newspaper*, 24 February 2010, <http://aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/> (accessed 24 February 2010).

the time being, there is no political will to formalize interagency cooperation. Agencies and individuals must therefore take steps to achieve maximum effectiveness within the existing framework. Important elements of this are to educate organizations and individuals on what a WoGA means, to educate people on the cultures, procedures, possibilities and limitations of the different ministries, and to choose leaders that can get results in the current system based on personal competencies.

GLOSSARY

CIMIC (NATO). The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organizations and agencies (AJP-9, article 102-1).

CIMIC (UN). The system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support and planning at all levels between military and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, of the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives (UN Dept. of Peacekeeping operations).

Civil-Military Cooperation. This paper uses the term “Civil-Military Cooperation” meaning interagency cooperation in the context of a WoGA. The use of “Civil-Military Cooperation” instead of “CIMIC” is deliberate. The reason is that “CIMIC” historically has many definitions and might therefore be interpreted in many ways (see below for examples).

Comprehensive Approach. See Whole of Government Approach.

Interagency. Involving government agencies and departments (JP 3-08).

Phasing. Reaching the military end-state usually requires the conduct of several operations that are arranged in phases of a campaign or major operation. U.S. doctrine uses the Phasing Model as a starting point for planning. The model divides a campaign/operation into six generic phases: (1) Shape-(2) Deter-(3) Seize initiative-(4) Dominate-(5) Stabilize-(6) Enable civil authority (JP 3-0, IV-27.).

Shape-Clear-Hold-Build. One of several counterinsurgency approaches. A shape-clear-hold-build operation is executed in a specific, high priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations. It has the following objectives (1) Shape the environment to enhance the possibility of success, (2) Create a secure physical and psychological environment, (3) Establish firm government control of the populace and area and (4) Gain the populace support.

Unified Action. The synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 3-0, GL-28.).

Unity of Command. The preferred doctrinal method for achieving unity of effort. Achieved by establishing and maintaining formal command and support relationships. When unity in command is not possible, commanders work to achieve unity of effort through coordination and cooperation (FM 3-0, 2-3).

Unity of Effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command organization-the product of successful unified action (JP 1).

Whole of Government Approach. An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the government to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal.

APPENDIX A

REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW

From

Major Finn Ola Helleberg
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Date

15.11.2009

REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW- MASTERS THESIS.

My name is Finn Ola Helleberg, I am a major in the Norwegian army, currently serving as a student at *US Army Command and General Staff College* in the USA.

As a part of my education, I have chosen to pursue a Masters program in Military Arts and Science. My thesis has the preliminary title: *"Wielding the military shield and the civilian sword – civil-military cooperation in Faryab Province in Afghanistan."* Using the 2009 Norwegian Strategy for Faryab Province in Afghanistan, and its focus on civil-military cooperation, as a starting point, my paper aims at doing research on what promotes and disrupts interagency cooperation and unity of effort. More specifically, the paper seeks to answer whether the new strategy will be effective in achieving a true comprehensive approach to the challenges in Afghanistan.

My primary research question is; *"Will the 2009 Norwegian strategy for civil-military efforts in Faryab Province lead to true unified action and unity of effort?"*

The overall purpose of the paper is to analyze civil-military cooperation in a Norwegian context, and to make recommendations on how to achieve unified action and unity of effort in the future.

Most of my research will be based on written sources; books, articles, reports, doctrine etc. In addition I wish to interview a small number of key personnel in order to reveal aspects not covered in written sources. At the same time, such interviews may contribute to the correctness of my conclusions and recommendations, since they provide information based on Norwegian experience. To balance the information I wish to interview both civilian and military personnel with experience from different levels in the organizations that operate in Afghanistan. To this purpose, I request your participation in an interview.

Since I am stationed in the U.S., I do not have the possibility to conduct face to face interviews. I have therefore chosen to do written interviews via e-mail. Please see attachments for details. My paper will be UNCLASSIFIED

I hope you will find the time and interest to support my work.

Yours Sincerely

Finn Ola Helleberg
Major, Norwegian Army
US Army Command and General Staff College.

Attachments: A: Interview-guide and questions (English and Norwegian version)
 B: Consent and use agreement for written history materials (English)

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Interview-guide and questions

This e-mail interview consists of 18 questions, which are all derived from theory, doctrine and other written sources covering my topic, and the 2009 Norwegian strategy for Faryab Province.

All questions are written in the past tense. This is due to U.S. regulations and adaptation to what is called an “oral history” interview. The format covers everything that has happened until this moment, and aims at providing information from peoples experience with a topic. The questions are also quite broad in order to provide the person being interviewed with an opportunity to elaborate.

You do not have to answer all the questions. Their purpose is first and foremost to give you an idea of the topics I would like to learn more about.

Even if you do not answer all the questions as such, I would ask you to cover the topics. This way I will get the information needed to make sense of my research.

I also encourage that you comment on factors not covered by the questions, that you find important to the topic.

If there are elements in your answers that I do not understand, I would like to have the opportunity to contact you and clarify. That way we can avoid misunderstandings.

I ask that the information you provide can be used in my Masters thesis, which will be publicly available through the library at CGSC.

If you wish to remain anonymous, or confidentiality concerning parts of the information, I will respect this. However, I ask that all information is UNCLASSIFIED.

You will also have the possibility to read through any information I use in my paper, prior to it being submitted. Please let me know if you wish to do so. The information you provide will not be published, or used for other purposes without your consent.

Having read this, I ask you to fill out, and return via e-mail, the form concerning consent to my use of the information you provide. (Attachment B)

Thank you for your participation!

INTRODUCTION

Question 1

Please state your name, and the following related to your contribution to the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan; timeframe, the organization you were assigned to, and position/duty title.

ORGANIZATION

Question 2

Based on your position/duty title, which agencies/departments/organizations did you most directly cooperate or coordinate with on a recurring basis?

Question 3

How was the cooperation/coordination done at your level?

Question 4

Was it clear, and was there a common understanding of which was the *“lead-agency,”* or in other words who decided on priorities and allocation of resources?

Question 5

It is my understanding that Norwegian development projects in Faryab province are suggested by the PRT, approved and funded by the embassy in Kabul or the Ministry of Foreign affairs, and then executed by NGOs and other non state actors.

To what extent has the Norwegian way of organizing the efforts promoted or hampered civil-military cooperation and the strive for a comprehensive approach and unity of effort?

Question 6

The way of organizing described in question 5 is quite unique to Norway. To what extent, and in what way, have Norwegian domestic political issues and guidelines affected cooperation between the different agencies in Faryab?

PLANNING/EXECUTION/ASSESSMENT

Question 7

How did the different agencies participate and contribute to the planning process concerning the operations in Faryab?

Question 8

To what degree did civil and military agencies have a common understanding of the situation and problem(s) and how to solve them?

Question 9

At what level were goals/ends decided and described? (locally, embassy/NCC, FOHK, departments)?

Question 10

At what level were courses of action/ways and means decided and described?

Question 11

In your opinion, did all involved agencies have a common understanding on how to assess the efforts made, and the factors to be used to assess success?

COORDINATION/COOPERATION**Question 12**

Was the coordination/cooperation between civilians and military organizations efficient and effective?

Question 13

What do you think have been the biggest challenges in achieving cooperation and unity of effort in Faryab? (Please provide a brief description of the issues leading to these challenges)

Question 14

Which factors have promoted cooperation and coordination between civilian and military agencies in Faryab?

Question 15

a) To what extent has the Norwegian military units under ISAF/NO command been necessary in order to ensure that civilian and military/security efforts support the same goals?

In many other countries current doctrine describes that who supports who between civilian and military agencies will be the result of the situation, rather than a principle, when it comes to achieving the strategic and operational goals and objectives.

b) How did you see this two-sided dependency between agencies? Were there different views in your organization?

CONCLUSION**Question 16**

According to the new Norwegian strategy, all personnel are to participate in better training prior to deployment. What should be covered in this training?

Question 17

If you are familiar with the new Norwegian strategy; To what extent, and in what way, will the new strategy contribute to enhanced coordination and unity of effort in Faryab province?

Question 18

Are there other areas not covered in the questions that you would like to comment on?

APPENDIX C

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT.

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR WRITTEN HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this e-mail history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at +1 913-306-3303 or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at +1 913-684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, _____, participated in a written e-mail history interview conducted by

Major Finn Ola Helleberg, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: _____ concerning the

following topic: Norwegian Civil-Military cooperation in Faryab Province, Afghanistan.

2. I understand that the transcript resulting from this e-mail history interview will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the transcript of any oral follow up of the e-mail for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete transcript of this e-mail history interview, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the writings in the e-mail(s) with the following caveat:

_____ None _____ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this written e-mail history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the transcripts resulting from this e-mail history interview may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

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